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To: Interested Parties
From: William T. Allen, Chairman
One of the Board’s major activities since its establishment has been 
developing a conceptual framework for auditor independence to 
help the Board issue principles-based independence standards for 
auditors of public companies.
As an initial step in articulating such a framework, the Board is 
issuing the enclosed Discussion Memorandum. The DM describes 
the issues the Board believes it should consider in a conceptual 
framework and asks respondents for their views through a series of 
questions in each section. A separate list of all the questions is 
attached for your convenience. The Board also welcomes 
comments and suggestions on any other matters relating to the 
development of the conceptual framework.
The Board recognizes that the issues discussed are complex and 
that the document is lengthy. We appreciate the time that 
respondents will spend to study the DM. It is not necessary for 
each respondent to reply to each question, but we are particularly 
interested in responses to the questions in Section I of the DM. In 
any event, for those questions to which you do respond, a 
discussion of your reasoning would be particularly helpful to the 
Board in its future deliberations.
The Board gratefully acknowledges the contributions made to the 
development, content, and writing of this Discussion Memorandum 
by the Director of the Conceptual Framework Project, Henry R. 
Jaenicke, the C. D. Clarkson Professor of Accounting at Drexel 
University, and by the Associate Project Director, Alan S. Glazer, 
Professor of Business Administration at Franklin & Marshall 
College.
Any individual or organization may obtain one copy of this 
Discussion Memorandum (DM 00-1), without charge, by
1211 Avenue of the Americas, New York, NY 10036-8775 
(212) 596-6133 • fax (212) 596-6137 
Web site: www.cpaindependence.org
contacting the ISB. The DM is also available on the ISB website at 
www.cpaindependence.org.
Your responses, which must be received by May 31, 2000, may be 
sent via:
1. mail: Independence Standards Board, 6 Floor
1211 Avenue of the Americas 
New York, NY 10036-8775
2. fax: (212) 596-6137
3. e-mail isb@cpaindependence.org
Please reference DM 00-1 in your correspondence.
All responses will be available for public inspection and copying 
for one year at the offices of the Independence Standards Board and 
also at the library of the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants (AICPA), Harborside Financial Center, 201 Plaza 
Three, Jersey City, NJ, telephone (201) 938-3000.
Thank you in advance for your time and effort.
A Conceptual Framework for Auditor Independence
Discussion Memorandum
Executive Summary
As part of its "Objective and Mission,” the Independence Standards Board (ISB) is 
committed “to develop a conceptual framework for independence applicable to audits of 
public entities which will serve as the foundation for the development of principles-based 
independence standards.” This Discussion Memorandum (DM) is the first step in a process 
that will culminate in the development of a conceptual framework for auditor independence. 
Readers are asked to respond to general questions as well as more specific questions about the 
usefulness and completeness of the various components of a conceptual framework that are 
discussed in the DM and about their views on alternative formulations of those components. 
The ISB will consider the comments received on this DM and, after deliberation, issue for 
public comment an Exposure Draft, which will then be followed by a final conceptual 
framework document or documents.
A conceptual framework for auditor independence is intended to
• help the ISB meet its responsibilities to set sound and internally consistent 
independence standards by providing direction and structure for resolving 
independence issues and questions
• help stakeholders in auditor independence understand the significance of 
auditor independence and the various processes that are in place to ensure it
• focus debate and serve as boundaries for discussions about auditor 
independence issues, thereby helping stakeholders contribute to the development of, 
and better understand the rationale underlying, ISB standards
The DM should stimulate discussion about alternative goals, definitions, and concepts 
of auditor independence, and about the role that the perceptions of various stakeholders play 
in the development of independence standards. Consistent with the objectives of the federal 
securities acts, however, the Board’s mission is more narrowly focused on establishing 
independence standards applicable to audits of public companies in order to serve the public 
interest and to protect and promote the confidence of investors in the securities markets. The 
breadth of the issues raised in this DM is not intended to suggest that the Board’s primary 
focus in setting independence standards will change in the future.
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The DM is designed to be a neutral document. Where appropriate, it discusses issues 
from different points of view in order to stimulate constructive dialogue. In some instances, 
only single points of view are expressed because the ISB has not been able to develop 
operational alternatives to those views. In those cases, respondents are encouraged to 
describe alternative viewpoints.
The DM covers the importance of reliable financial statements to the capital markets 
and to various groups of stakeholders, regulation of the auditing profession in the United 
States, and various environmental factors that may create pressures on auditor independence, 
alleviate those pressures, and motivate auditors and auditing firms to maintain their 
independence. The DM notes that quality audits help ensure financial statement reliability. 
The level of audit quality is a function of many factors, including the personal attributes that 
individual auditors bring to an engagement. Auditor independence is only one factor and does 
not, by itself, produce a quality audit or guarantee that audit failures will not occur. To 
provide a context for understanding the audit process and how auditor independence relates to 
that process, the DM describes aspects of the environment in which audits take place.
The DM discusses alternative goals of auditor independence. Those goals could be 
expressed in terms of helping ensure that auditors are willing to exercise appropriate personal 
attributes—such as competence, diligence, integrity, and objectivity—for the purpose of 
improving the reliability of audited financial statements. Alternatively, they could be 
expressed in terms of helping ensure that auditors do not engage in activities or have 
relationships that may impair independence. The goals also could include helping ensure that 
users and other stakeholders perceive that those goals have been achieved, as a way to 
enhance the credibility of audited financial statements and improve stakeholder confidence.
The DM describes alternative sets of definitions of auditor independence based on the 
alternative goals. One set is based on a “personal attributes approach” and another on an 
“activities and relationships approach.” Definitions that include explicit reference to 
stakeholders’ perceptions also are presented.
The alternative definitions of independence are based on the assumption that certain 
factors—referred to as threats to auditor independence—may have a negative effect on 
auditor behavior. Threats arise from numerous and diverse pressures, activities, and 
relationships in the auditing environment. The possibility that a negative effect will result 
suggests the existence of risk—referred to as independence risk—that a threat may impair 
auditor independence. That negative effect could be avoided or mitigated, however, if one or 
more controls—referred to as safeguards to auditor independence—exist or are put in place. 
Safeguards to auditor independence exist in the environment in which audits are performed or 
are mandated by regulators, standard setters, or firms in response to threats to auditor 
independence. The DM discusses factors that may affect the significance of threats and the 
effectiveness of safeguards. It also considers whether stakeholder perceptions and the 
benefits and costs of independence should be included as concepts of auditor independence.
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The DM examines basic principles of auditor independence based on the above 
concepts and asks for respondents’ views on those principles:
Basic Principle 1: Different types of threats to auditor independence—including self­
interest, self-review, advocacy, familiarity (or trust), and intimidation—arise in 
different circumstances.
Basic Principle 2: The significance of threats created in specific circumstances affects 
the level of independence risk.
Basic Principle 3: Different types of safeguards—including prohibitions, restrictions, 
other policies and procedures, and disclosures—can mitigate or eliminate threats to 
auditor independence.
Basic Principle 4: The effectiveness of the design and operation of various safeguards 
affects the level of independence risk.
Basic Principle 5: The ISB should assess the level of independence risk by considering 
the significance of the threats to auditor independence created by specific 
circumstances and the effectiveness of the safeguards that mitigate or eliminate those 
threats when it develops standards for auditor independence.
Basic Principle 6: The ISB should determine whether, in the specific circumstances 
under consideration, the level of independence risk is acceptably low.
Basic Principle 7: The ISB should consider which individuals in an auditing firm (as 
well as the firm itself) are affected by one or more threats to auditor independence in 
the specific circumstances under consideration and whether one or more safeguards 
effectively mitigate or eliminate those threats.
Basic Principle 8: The ISB should weigh the costs of alternative safeguards against the 
benefits of reduced independence risk resulting from those safeguards when it 
develops standards for auditor independence.
The DM also discusses factors that may affect perceptions of auditor independence 
and notes that different stakeholder groups and different individuals within a particular 
stakeholder group may have different perceptions about auditors and matters related to auditor 
independence. The DM describes several alternatives for a ninth basic principle of auditor 
independence to address the role of stakeholders’ perceptions in the ISB’s standard-setting 
process. Each of those alternatives could lead to a basic principle of auditor independence 
that addresses how the ISB should consider stakeholders’ perceptions in setting independence 
standards. Such a principle could be expressed as one of the following:
iii
Basic Principle 9A: The ISB should solicit the views of all stakeholders and develop 
independence standards that reflect stakeholders’ perceptions.
Basic Principle 9B: The ISB should solicit the views of all stakeholders but develop 
independence standards that reflect the likely perceptions of a hypothetical group of 
stakeholders, namely, “reasonable, fully informed users of financial statements.”
Basic Principle 9C: The ISB should solicit the views of all stakeholders and be 
informed by stakeholders’ perceptions, but develop independence standards based on 
the ISB’s judgment about how best to meet the goal or goals of auditor independence.
The DM concludes by noting that, regardless of the ISB’s eventual conclusions about 
stakeholders’ perceptions, effective communication between the ISB and stakeholders can 
help shape stakeholders’ opinions about ISB standards and the process by which those 
standards are promulgated and, ultimately, enhance stakeholders’ confidence in financial 
statement reliability and the independence of auditors in general.
iv
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Summary of Questions for Respondents
The DM asks for responses to the following questions:
Question I-1: Do you believe that a conceptual framework for auditor independence 
that contains goals, definitions, concepts, and basic principles will be useful to the 
ISB? Are there other components that should be included in a conceptual framework? 
Please explain your views.
Question I-2: Do you believe that the conceptual framework components discussed in 
this DM will be useful to stakeholders other than the ISB? Please explain your views.
Question I-3: Should the ISB consider the interests of all stakeholders when it sets 
independence standards? If stakeholders or stakeholder groups have competing 
interests, whose interests should prevail?
Question II-1: Are there factors related to the audit environment, other than those 
discussed in Section II, that are relevant to, and should be considered in, a conceptual 
framework for auditor independence? If so, please describe those factors and their 
relevance to auditor independence.
Question III-1: Which of the goals described in Section III should form the basis for 
the goal or goals of auditor independence to be included in a conceptual framework? 
Please explain your views and discuss other goals that should be considered.
Question IV-1: Which of the alternatives described in Section IV should form the 
basis for a definition of auditor independence to be included in a conceptual 
framework? Please explain your views and discuss other definitions or approaches to 
defining auditor independence that should be considered.
Question V-l: Do you believe that the concepts discussed in Section
V—independence risk, threats to auditor independence and their significance, 
safeguards to auditor independence and their effectiveness, stakeholders’ perceptions 
in independence considerations, and benefits and costs of auditor independence—are 
useful and should be included in a conceptual framework? What other concepts, if 
any, would be useful? Please explain your views.
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Question VI-1: Do you believe that the principles described in Section VI will be 
useful to the ISB in developing future standards? Please explain your views and 
discuss other types of guidance that you believe would make the conceptual 
framework more useful to the ISB or to other stakeholders.
Question VI-2: Do you believe that it is useful to analyze threats based on their nature 
and significance? Please explain your views and discuss types of threats other than 
those identified in Section VI that should be considered in a conceptual framework for 
auditor independence.
Question VI-3: Do you believe that it is useful to analyze safeguards based on their 
type and effectiveness? Please explain your views and discuss types of safeguards 
other than those identified in Section that should be considered in a conceptual 
framework for auditor independence.
Question VI-4: Do you believe that the ISB should consider which individuals in an 
auditing firm (as well as the firm itself) are affected by one or more threats to auditor 
independence in the specific circumstances under consideration and by one or more 
safeguards that effectively mitigate or eliminate those threats? Please explain your 
views.
Question VI-5: Do you believe that the ISB should weigh the costs of alternative 
safeguards against the benefits of reduced independence risk resulting from those 
safeguards when it develops new independence standards? Why or why not? Please 
discuss your views about how the ISB should measure the costs and benefits of 
alternative safeguards.
Question VII-1: Are there aspects of stakeholders’ perceptions other than those 
discussed in this DM that are relevant to, and should be considered in, a conceptual 
framework for auditor independence? If so, please describe them and their relevance 
to auditor independence.
Question VII-2: Which of the alternatives described in Section VII, if any, should 
form the basis for a basic principle related to consideration of stakeholders’ 
perceptions to be included in a conceptual framework? Please explain your views.
Question VII-3: Are there ways other than those noted in the alternative basic 
principles described in Section VII by which the ISB could consider stakeholders’ 
perceptions in its standard-setting process? If so, please describe them.
vi
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SECTION I —INTRODUCTION
1. The mission of the Independence Standards Board (ISB) is to develop, through a public 
process, concepts, principles, and standards of auditor independence. Compliance with those 
concepts, principles, and standards is expected, among other things, to offer assurance to 
various stakeholders in auditor independence  that auditors who attest to the financial 
statements of public entities are independent. As part of its “Objective and Mission,” the 
ISB is committed “to develop a conceptual framework for independence applicable to audits 
of public entities which will serve as the foundation for the development of principles-based 
independence standards.” The ISB is issuing this Discussion Memorandum (DM) to 
encourage interested groups and individuals to submit written comments on issues related to 
developing a conceptual framework for auditor independence.
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2. The DM should stimulate discussion about alternative goals, definitions, and concepts 
of auditor independence, and about the role that the perceptions of various stakeholders play 
in the development of independence standards. Consistent with the objectives of the federal 
securities acts, however, the Board’s mission is more narrowly focused on establishing 
independence standards applicable to audits of public companies in order to serve the public 
interest and to protect and promote the confidence of investors in the securities markets. The 
breadth of the issues raised in this DM is not intended to suggest that the Board’s primary 
focus in setting independence standards will change in the future.
1 Words and phrases that appear in the Glossary are set in boldface type the first time they are used in the 
Discussion Memorandum.
Purposes Served by a Conceptual Framework
3. A conceptual framework for auditor independence is expected to serve several 
purposes:
• help the ISB meet its responsibilities to set sound and internally consistent 
independence standards by providing direction and structure for resolving 
independence issues and questions
• help stakeholders understand the significance of auditor independence and the 
various processes that are in place to ensure it
• focus debate and serve as boundaries for discussions about auditor independence 
issues, thereby helping stakeholders contribute to the development of, and better 
understand the rationale underlying, ISB standards
1
4. The conceptual framework is not intended, by itself, to resolve auditor independence 
issues and will not amend, modify, or interpret existing independence rules. The ISB 
recognizes, however, that some of those rules may be inconsistent with elements of the 
framework. In due course, the ISB expects to reexamine existing rules governing auditor 
independence to deal with any such inconsistencies.
Project Steps
5. The ISB’s conceptual framework project is being developed in accordance with its 
established due process. This document represents the first step in that process—the 
issuance of a DM soliciting public comment on issues related to the framework’s 
development. Where appropriate, issues are discussed from different points of view in order 
to stimulate constructive dialogue. In some parts of the DM, only a single point of view is 
expressed because the ISB has not been able to develop operational alternatives to those 
views. In those cases, respondents are encouraged to describe alternative viewpoints.
6. This DM first describes the environment in which auditors practice and the importance 
of auditing to the capital markets. Subsequent sections consider the goals of auditor 
independence and definitions of independence based on those goals. The final sections discuss 
auditor independence concepts and basic principles that the ISB could use in resolving specific 
independence issues.
7. The ISB will consider comments received on this DM and, after deliberation, issue for 
public comment an Exposure Draft of a proposed conceptual framework for auditor 
independence. After considering the comments it receives, the ISB will issue its conceptual 
framework document or documents.
Questions for Respondents
8. At the beginning of each subsequent section of this DM, questions are posed to 
encourage respondents to comment on specific issues. In addition, all respondents are asked 
to include their views concerning (a) the usefulness of a conceptual framework for auditor 
independence and (b) how the ISB should consider competing stakeholder interests. The 
following three questions may be helpful in structuring those responses:
Question I-1: Do you believe that a conceptual framework for auditor 
independence that contains goals, definitions, concepts, and basic principles will 
be useful to the ISB? Are there other components that should be included in a 
conceptual framework? Please explain your views.
Question I-2: Do you believe that the conceptual framework components 
discussed in this DM will be useful to stakeholders other than the ISB? Please 
explain your views.
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Question I-3: Should the ISB consider the interests of all stakeholders when it 
sets independence standards? If stakeholders or stakeholder groups have 
competing interests, whose interests should prevail?
3

SECTION II —THE AUDIT ENVIRONMENT AND ITS 
IMPLICATIONS FOR AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE
9. This section describes aspects of the environment in which audits take place to help 
readers understand the audit process and how auditor independence relates to that process. 
The aspects include: the importance of auditing to the capital markets and to various groups of 
stakeholders, the regulation of the auditing profession in the United States, and factors 
affecting auditor independence.
10. The basic question raised by this section is:
Question II-1: Are there factors related to the audit environment, other than 
those discussed in this section, that are relevant to, and should be considered in, 
a conceptual framework for auditor independence? If so, please describe those 
factors and their relevance to auditor independence.
Importance of Auditing to the Capital Markets2
2 This part of Section II focuses on the values or benefits of an audit. There are also costs associated with audits, 
but only the costs of auditor independence (discussed in Sections V and VI) are relevant for this DM.
3There has been considerable debate in the auditing literature on the question, “Who is the client?” For 
example, the report of the Public Oversight Board’s Advisory Panel on Auditor Independence, Strengthening the 
Professionalism of the Independent Auditor (New York: Public Oversight Board, 1994), recommends that the 
auditor consider the board of directors, not management, as the client. This DM uses the term “auditee,” rather 
than “client,” to denote the entity whose financial statements are being audited.
4As discussed in Section VI, the composition of the class contemplated by the term “auditor” may be specified 
by the ISB in the context of specific independence standards.
5Kinney and Martin analyzed previously published studies on audit-related adjustments and concluded that “the 
year-end audit is seen as directly reducing positive bias in preaudit net earnings and net assets as well as 
improving the precision of measurement” (William D. Kinney, Jr., and Roger D. Martin, “Does Auditing 
Reduce Bias in Financial Reporting? A Review of Audit-Related Adjustment Studies,” Auditing: A Journal of 
Practice & Theory [Spring 1994], pp. 149-56). The research summarized in this study included audits of both 
public and private entities and a wide range of industries, entity sizes, auditing firms, and time periods.
6 It should be recognized that an auditor’s ability to improve the reliability of financial statements is limited by 
the nature of the audit process. Audit evidence may be persuasive but rarely is conclusive, and even persuasive 
11. There is widespread agreement that audited financial statements are an important 
component of the financial information that is available to the capital markets. Audits add 
value to financial statements by improving their reliability. Audits improve financial 
statement reliability because management of the auditee  corrects the statements to reflect 
knowledge that an auditor  obtains during the audit and communicates to it, but that 
previously had not been reflected appropriately in the financial statements. Even when audits 
do not result in corrections to the statements, they make financial statements more reliable by 
motivating auditee management (a) to avoid misstatements in the first place (because it knows 
that the statements will be subject to correction as a result of the audit) and (b) to consult with 
auditors about how to account for complex transactions before those transactions are 
recorded.5,6 Improved financial statement reliability reduces information risk. Reduced 
3
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information risk helps to lower the cost of capital to auditees; it also helps to improve the 
decisions of users of financial statements, thereby enhancing the effectiveness of the capital 
markets in allocating resources.
12. Financial statement reliability is likely to improve when an auditor performs a quality 
audit. The level of audit quality is a function of many factors, including the personal 
attributes that individual auditors bring to an engagement. Auditor independence is only one 
of those factors. Accordingly, independence alone does not produce a quality audit, nor does 
it guarantee that audit failures will not occur.
13. Controls within firms, the auditing profession, and society also affect the level of audit 
quality. Those controls include the entire system of public regulation and self-regulation of 
the profession, including an auditing firm’s system of quality control. Auditor independence, 
and the controls that operate to ensure independence, are only one source, albeit an important 
source, of quality audits and improved financial statement reliability.
14. Audits also are important to the capital markets because they enhance the credibility 
of financial statements.  In the context of financial statements, credibility means that 
stakeholders in auditor independence believe that an entity’s financial position, results of 
operations, and cash flows are presented fairly in conformity with generally accepted 
accounting principles (GAAP) in all material respects—that is, that stakeholders perceive the 
financial statements to be more reliable because they were audited.  Stakeholders’ confidence 
in the reliability of the financial statements may affect their perceptions of information risk 
and their resource-allocation decisions.
7
8
evidence is obtainable only at a cost. Additional auditing procedures might increase the persuasiveness of the 
evidence obtained, but at a cost that might exceed the benefit of the additional procedures. Moreover, the 
characteristics of fraud—such as concealment, collusion, and falsified documents—limit an auditor’s ability to 
improve financial statement reliability.
7 There are other benefits that flow from audits of financial statements. For example, auditors often 
communicate suggestions for improving internal control to auditees’ managements and audit committees. 
Because those benefits are not related to the mission of the ISB, they are not addressed in this DM.
8 Researchers who use a contracting perspective to study auditor independence express this notion somewhat 
differently. For example, DeAngelo notes that “the ex ante value of an audit to consumers of audit services 
(which include current and potential owners, managers, consumers of the firm’s products, etc.) depends on 
the auditor’s perceived ability to (1) discover errors or breaches in the accounting system, and (2) withstand 
client pressures to disclose selectively in the event a breach is discovered” (Linda E. De Angelo, “Auditor 
Independence, ‘Low Balling’, and Disclosure Regulation,” Journal of Accounting and Economics [Vol. 3, 
1981], p. 115).
Stakeholders in Auditor Independence
15. Many individuals and groups have an interest in, and benefit from, reliable financial 
statements and the quality audits that help to ensure them. External users of financial 
statements—including current and potential investors, creditors, and others—want reliable 
financial statements on which to base their resource-allocation decisions. Quality audits help 
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to provide that reliability, thereby reducing users’ information risk. Auditors’ interests are 
served by quality audits because they satisfy auditors’ professional responsibilities under 
generally accepted auditing standards (GAAS) and enhance auditors’ professional reputations. 
Auditees (including auditee management, audit committees, and boards of directors) have an 
interest in quality audits because, by reducing users’ information risk, they help to lower 
auditees’ cost of capital. Quality audits also help to ensure that auditee managements meet 
their responsibilities to prepare reliable financial statements. Regulators and standard-setters 
(including the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission [SEC], state boards of accountancy, 
the ISB, and the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants [AICPA]) can increase 
the effectiveness of the capital markets by promulgating rules and regulations that help ensure 
that audits improve financial statement reliability. Although individuals in each of these 
groups—referred to in this DM as stakeholders in auditor independence—may have different 
knowledge and beliefs about auditors and the audit process, they share a common interest in 
auditor independence: namely, its importance as one component in the system that helps 
ensure quality audits and, ultimately, financial statement reliability.9
9 “The essence of the stakeholder idea is that those who may be significantly affected by an organization’s 
action, or who are potentially at risk as a result, have an obligation-generating ‘stake’ in that decision” 
(Thomas Donaldson and Thomas W. Dunfee, Ties that Bind: A Social Contracts Approach to Business Ethics 
[Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1999], p. 235). Although originally used in reference to 
business organizations, the term also is used in the business ethics literature to refer to those who have an 
interest in other types of entities or in concepts. (See, for example, Lucas D. Introna and Athanasia Pouloudi, 
“Privacy in the Information Age: Stakeholders, Interests and Values,” Journal of Business Ethics [Vol. 22, 
1999], pp. 27-38.)
16. Auditing firms, as well as public regulatory and self-regulatory bodies, have developed 
rules, policies, and procedures, including many related specifically to auditor independence, 
that help maintain audit quality. The major components of the system that regulates the 
auditing profession in the United States and their relationship to auditor independence are 
discussed in the next subsections.
Regulation of Auditors in the United States
17. Auditors in the United States are subject to a system of controls that, taken as a whole, 
constitutes the oversight or regulation of the profession. Controls that seek to maintain 
auditor independence are only one part of the regulatory fabric that has been developed to 
help ensure, and to assure stakeholders about, the quality of audits. This subsection describes 
briefly the system of public regulation and self-regulation of auditors in the United States, 
including aspects of that system directed specifically at auditor independence. The principal 
elements of the regulation of auditor independence are state boards of accountancy, the 
AICPA, and, for public entities, the SEC and the ISB—a combination of public and self­
regulation.
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18. Many stakeholders appear to rely, at least in part, on audited financial statements to 
help make decisions.  Their reliance suggests they believe that organizations and processes 
are in place to help ensure quality audits. It is difficult, however, to assess the extent to which 
various stakeholders are knowledgeable about specific controls and regulations that help 
ensure quality audits. Regulatory bodies and organizations concerned with the quality of 
audits take various steps to enable them to identify and respond to stakeholders’ needs and 
expectations and thereby enhance confidence in the regulatory process.
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19. Some stakeholder expectations about auditing can reasonably be fulfilled by one or 
more bodies or organizations involved in self-regulation. For example, the AICPA on 
numerous occasions has increased auditors’ responsibilities in response to the perceived needs 
of one or more groups of stakeholders.  Other stakeholder expectations, however, are best 
satisfied through public regulation. For example, a desire for monetary compensation when 
there is an audit failure may need to be fulfilled through the legal system. It must be 
recognized, however, that some expectations, such as absolute assurance that an audit will 
always detect material financial statement misstatements, are simply unachievable or can be 
achieved only at a cost that many believe exceeds the related benefit.
11
10 The results of a comprehensive survey of stockholders’ use of the components of corporate annual reports, 
including the financial statements and related information, can be found in Marc J. Epstein and Moses L. Pava, 
“The Shareholders’ Use of Corporate Annual Reports,” Vol. 2 in M. J. Epstein (Ed.), Studies in Managerial 
and Financial Accounting (Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 1993).
11 In 1996, the General Accounting Office issued a report, The Accounting Profession, Major Issues: Progress 
and Concerns, that included a review of recommendations made and actions taken by various organizations and 
bodies between 1972 and 1995 to improve the performance of independent audits of public entities. Although 
that report cited ongoing concerns in several areas, including concerns about auditor independence, it 
acknowledged that the profession generally had been responsive to recommendations for changes.
12 SEC Regulation S-X, Rule 2-01.
13 Some states also register or license firms to practice within their jurisdictions.
Components of Public Regulation
20. The basis for public regulation of auditors is found in federal and state laws and 
regulations that license accountants, specify ethical and technical standards, and enforce 
conformity with those laws, regulations, and standards. The components of public regulation 
include federal and state legislatures and regulatory agencies, including the SEC and state 
boards of accountancy, as well as the federal and state judicial systems. Audits of public 
entities must be performed by accountants who are “in good standing” and either “duly 
registered” or “entitled to practice” in the jurisdiction in which they live or work.  Statutory 
regulation for registering and licensing accountants is vested in state boards of accountancy. 
That regulation serves to protect the public interest by providing:
12
• reasonable assurance of the competence and moral character of individuals at the 
time they are initially licensed to perform regulated services13
8
• reasonable assurance that accountants demonstrate their continued professional 
qualifications to maintain or renew their licenses
• a disciplinary system that provides incentives for accountants to meet the 
profession’s ethical and technical standards
21. Federal regulators recognize certain private-sector bodies (such as the ISB) as 
promulgators of ethical and technical standards, subject to continuing oversight. State 
regulators also recognize certain standard-setting bodies in the private sector. For example, 
some state regulations incorporate the code of professional ethics of the AICPA or of the 
state’s society of CPAs.
22. The independence of auditors of public entities has long been a component of public 
regulation at the state and federal level. State boards of accountancy have independence 
requirements for auditors who are licensed or registered in their jurisdictions. Various federal 
legislation, beginning with the Securities Act of 1933, requires (or gives the SEC authority to 
require) public entities to retain auditors who are independent. Rule 2-01 of SEC Regulation 
S-X contains the current version of those requirements and related guidance concerning how 
the determination of “independence” is to be made. The SEC also has published a large 
number of interpretations under Rule 2-01; these were reviewed in 1982 and published as part 
of the SEC’s “Codification of Financial Reporting Policies.” In addition, interpretive letters 
issued by the SEC staff in response to requests from various parties are available to the 
public. In 1998, the SEC recognized the ISB (subject to continuing oversight) as the private­
sector body with the authority to develop standards for auditor independence and to issue 
interpretations of existing rules.  The SEC intends to continue to enforce compliance with 
auditor independence standards, including those promulgated by the ISB.
14
14 SEC Financial Reporting Release No. 50, The Establishment and Improvement of Standards Related to 
Auditor Independence (February 18, 1998).
15 All U.S. firms whose partners are members of the AICPA and that audit SEC registrants must belong to the 
SECPS. Approximately 1,300 auditing firms (800 of which audit SEC registrants and 500 other firms that 
belong voluntarily) are members of the SECPS. Fewer than 50 U.S. firms that audit SEC registrants, auditing 
Components of Self-Regulation
23. The system of self-regulation of auditors includes controls within the auditing 
profession, as well as controls designed and implemented by auditing firms themselves. It is 
designed to meet the goals of achieving quality audits and enhancing public perceptions, 
confidence, and trust in auditors and in audited financial statements. The system has the 
following components:
• Membership standards—requirements that individuals must meet to qualify for 
membership in the AICPA, such as continuing professional education requirements, 
and that firms must meet to maintain membership in the SEC Practice Section (SECPS) 
of the AICPA Division for CPA Firms,  such as undergoing triennial peer reviews15
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• Ethical and technical standards—a code of ethical behavior for individuals; 
standards for determining auditor independence, both for auditors generally and 
specifically for auditors of financial statements issued by public entities; authoritative 
standards and nonauthoritative guidance for conducting audits
• Quality control standards—standards for designing and maintaining systems of 
quality controls over auditing services, including, for example, the systems of hiring, 
training, promoting, and compensating professional personnel, as well as the “tone at 
the top” in the firm; supplemental quality control standards applicable to members of 
the SECPS
• Monitoring—oversight (through peer review and other means) of individual and 
member firm compliance with established membership, ethical (including 
independence), technical, and quality control standards
• Discipline—a disciplinary system that deals with violations of the profession's 
membership, ethical (including independence), technical, and quality Control standards
24. Various bodies and organizations are responsible for carrying out self-regulation. They 
include auditing firms, committees and staff of the AICPA, state societies of CPAs, and the 
ISB. The AICPA bodies involved in self-regulation of auditors include the Board of Directors, 
the Auditing Standards Board, the Board of Examiners, the Professional Ethics Executive 
Committee, the Joint Trial Board, the Peer Review Committee, and the SECPS. Many state 
societies of CPAs also participate in the self-regulation of the profession in conjunction with 
the AICPA, such as through the Joint Ethics Enforcement Program.
25. The Public Oversight Board (POB) provides independent oversight of the profession’s 
self-regulatory programs for SECPS members. It monitors and evaluates the activities of the 
SECPS and its committees to ensure their effectiveness. It also monitors and may comment 
publicly on matters that relate to the overall quality of auditing and financial reporting out of a 
belief that “it would ill serve the public interest if the profession’s quality control programs 
were a model of integrity and effectiveness while other forces and circumstances destroyed the 
public’s confidence in the credibility of financial reporting in the United States.”16
26. Various bodies and organizations within the auditing profession have issued a large 
number of rules and regulations dealing with auditor independence. By the early 1940s, the 
American Institute of Accountants (predecessor to the AICPA) had incorporated 
independence rules in its Code of Professional Ethics. A decade later, independence was 
recognized as one of the ten “generally accepted auditing standards,” a designation that it has 
less than 100 registrants in total (out of more than 15,000 total SEC registrants), are not members of the SECPS 
(SECPS Annual Report, Year Ended June 30, 1997, and telephone conversation with SECPS staff).
16 Public Oversight Board, 1997-98 Annual Report, p. 2.
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retained ever since.17 The current version of the AICPA’s Code of Professional Conduct 
includes a requirement that auditors be independent, and numerous interpretations of that 
requirement have been issued.
17 Statement on Auditing Standards No. 1, Codification of Auditing Standards and Procedures (AU Section 
150).
18 Statement on Quality Control Standards No. 2, System of Quality Control for a CPA Firm’s Accounting and 
Auditing Practice (New York: AICPA, 1996), para. 9.
19 Statement on Quality Control Standards No. 2, para. 23; Statement on Quality Control Standards No. 3, 
Monitoring a CPA Firm’s Accounting and Auditing Practice (New York: AICPA, 1996).
20 AICPA, SECPS, Peer Review Program Manual, “Quality Control Policies and Procedures and Membership 
Requirements Questionnaire” (New York: AICPA, 1997), section 13242.
21 See, for example, The Law & Economics Consulting Group, Inc., “An Economic Analysis of Auditor 
Independence for a Multi-Client, Multi-Service Public Accounting Firm,” in AICPA, Serving the Public 
Interest: A New Conceptual Framework for Auditor Independence [White Paper], (New York: AICPA, 1997), 
Appendix B.
27. The AICPA’s quality control standards also require each auditing firm to design and 
implement policies and procedures related to independence that are appropriate for the firm’s 
practice, based on factors such as its size and the nature and complexity of the services it 
offers to clients. Those standards specify that “policies and procedures should be established 
to provide the firm with reasonable assurance that personnel maintain independence (in fact 
and in appearance) in all required circumstances.”  Firms also are required to communicate 
their independence policies and procedures to appropriate firm personnel and to monitor 
compliance with them.  Implementation of the quality control standards, including those 
related to independence, is tested during the triennial peer reviews required by the SECPS 
membership rules.
18
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Factors Affecting Auditor Independence
28. This subsection describes various factors that may affect auditor independence, 
including factors that motivate auditors and auditing firms to maintain their independence.
Economic Motivations for Maintaining Auditor Independence
29. It has been argued that auditors who behave rationally will endeavor to perform quality 
audits because of economic incentives, namely, the firms’ stake in their reputational capital 
and their interest in avoiding the costs of malpractice suits.  Auditing firms, their owners, 
and others who work in those firms thus share an interest in maintaining the firm’s 
reputational capital. High-quality auditing and its effects on a firm’s reputation help the firm 
attract and retain audit clients. Auditee managements and directors also are interested in 
retaining auditors with high reputational capital because doing so adds credibility to auditees’ 
financial statements and reduces their cost of capital.
21
11
30. Controls to help ensure auditor independence help protect against the rogue behavior 
of “free riders”—individual auditors who pursue their own short-term interests that are at 
odds with the interests of the auditing firm. Those controls are based, in part, on the premise 
that it is in each individual auditor’s and each auditing firm’s best interests to comply with 
professional standards, including those related to auditor independence, that help ensure 
quality audits.
Economics of Auditing Firms
31. Financial statement audits performed by auditing firms in the private sector have 
always had both commercial and professional aspects. Notwithstanding that, Congress 
mandated that audits of SEC registrants be performed by independent auditors in the private 
sector, rather than by government auditors. There has been no significant interest in replacing 
the current system by, for example, moving the auditing of registrants into the public sector.
32. Private-sector auditing comes under the aegis of the federal rules against restraint of 
trade. In 1989, the Federal Trade Commission and the AICPA entered into a consent decree 
that allowed auditing firms to advertise and to accept, from other than audit and certain other 
clients, commissions, contingent fees, and referral fees. All of these had been banned 
previously by the AICPA’s ethics code. In its 1978 report, the Commission on Auditors’ 
Responsibilities noted the “excessive competition” in the accounting profession at that time.  
Many observers believe that the level of competition among providers of auditing services has 
increased substantially since then.
22
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33. Over the past several decades, the mix of services offered by many auditing firms has 
changed dramatically. Previously, firms provided primarily audit and tax services. Their 
consulting practices were relatively small, concentrating on accounting and other services that 
CPAs were uniquely qualified to provide. Many firms now have consulting practices that 
rival their audit and tax practices in revenues and profits.  In addition, the tax and consulting 24
22 Commission on Auditors’ Responsibilities, Report, Conclusions, and Recommendations (New York: 
AICPA, 1978), p. 110.
23 Considerable research has been conducted that examines the competitiveness of the market for audit services. 
Empirical work on three important elements of that market—audit fees, auditor concentration, and auditor 
choice—is summarized in James A. Yardley, N. Leroy Kaufman, Timothy D. Cairney, and W. David Albrecht, 
“Supplier Behavior in the U.S. Audit Market,” Journal of Accounting Literature (Vol. 11, 1992), pp. 151-84.
24 For example, Public Accounting Report conducts an annual survey of the largest U.S. auditing firms 
(“national firms”). Data from those surveys show that those firms generated, on average, 46% of their U.S. 
revenues in the 1998 fiscal year from “management consulting services” and 30.5% from “accounting and 
auditing services” (Public Accounting Report [Special Supplement, February 28, 1999], p. 1). Previous years’ 
surveys showed that the percentage of total revenues derived from management consulting services has grown 
steadily at these firms throughout the 1990s—revenues from such activities were only 27% of those firms’ total 
revenues in the 1992 fiscal year (Public Accounting Report [May 31, 1997]). A similar trend was reported for 
the 100 largest U.S. auditing firms, although, on average, revenues from management advisory services represent 
a smaller percentage of those firms’ total revenues (16% in fiscal 1998) than they do for national firms (46% in 
the same period) (Public Accounting Report [August 31, 1999]). These trends, and their potential impact on 
auditor independence, are discussed by Ralph S. Saul, “What Ails the Accounting Profession?” Accounting 
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practices of many large firms now derive a substantial portion of their revenues from non­
audit clients, which loosens the bonds that traditionally tied audit, tax, and consulting 
practices and personnel together.
34. Concerns about the potential pressures on auditor independence created by the rapid 
growth in consulting and other non-audit services have been discussed widely in the auditing 
literature. For example, the AICPA’s Special Committee on Financial Reporting (Jenkins 
Committee) noted that users of financial statements “are concerned that auditors may accept 
audit engagements at marginal profits to obtain more profitable consulting engagements. 
Those arrangements could motivate auditors to reduce the amount of audit work and to be 
reluctant to irritate [auditee] management to protect the consulting relationship.”25
35. The SEC has shared that concern, and in 1978 issued a rule requiring registrants to 
disclose in their proxy statements information about non-audit services provided by 
registrants’ external auditors.  The requirement was later removed, however, because the 
SEC did not believe that the information was sufficiently useful to investors.
26
27
36. There also have been changes in many auditing firms’ infrastructures and personnel 
over the past few decades. Previously, firms had relatively small and decentralized 
infrastructures, even when the firms themselves grew quite large. Professionals began in a 
firm’s audit practice directly from undergraduate accounting programs, rose through the audit 
ranks or transferred to the tax or consulting practices if their interests and abilities so 
indicated, and either left the firm or became partners. Today, a higher proportion of 
professionals entering accounting firms have work experience, bring more diverse skills and 
expertise, and typically are hired into the specialty area in which they intend to practice. 
These circumstances may make creating and maintaining a firm-wide culture more difficult.
37. Furthermore, computerized systems for processing routine transactions and 
calculations have reduced the frequency of random clerical errors in the records underlying 
most auditees’ financial statements. Such systems permit auditing firms to use computer 
auditing techniques to perform what used to be time-consuming, labor-intensive auditing 
procedures. Many firms also have “reengineered” their audit processes to include more 
focused risk-assessment activities, better deployment of their resources toward areas of high 
audit risk, and increased audit efficiency. These changes have reduced the need for junior-level 
professional staff. Turnover among professionals is high, however, and difficulty in attracting 
Horizons (June 1996), pp. 131-37, and Michael H. Sutton, “Auditor Independence: The Challenge of Fact and 
Appearance,” Accounting Horizons (March 1997), pp. 86-91.
25 AICPA, Special Committee on Financial Reporting, Meeting the Information Needs of Investors and 
Creditors (New York: AICPA, 1994), p. 104.
26 SEC Accounting Series Release No. 250 (June 20, 1978).
27 SEC Accounting Series Release No. 304 (January 28, 1982). Research performed subsequent to the 
requirement failed to show any significant stakeholder reaction to this information or any significant change 
in the amount or types of non-audit services provided. See James H. Scheiner, “An Empirical Assessment 
of the Impact of SEC Nonaudit Service Disclosure Requirements on Independent Auditors and Their 
Clients,” Journal of Accounting Research (Autumn 1984), pp. 789-97, and G. William Glezen and James 
A. Millar, “An Empirical Investigation of Stockholder Reaction to Disclosures Required by ASR No. 250,” 
Journal of Accounting Research (Autumn 1985), pp. 859-70.
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and retaining qualified personnel often is identified as a major challenge facing the auditing 
profession.
38. The partner and manager-level personnel assigned to an audit are typically responsible 
for the engagement’s profitability. They usually negotiate a fee with auditee management that 
is subject to change only in the event of unanticipated cost overruns beyond the auditor’s 
control. Billing for audit engagements based on actual time and expenses, once the norm, is 
now the exception.
39. A common measure of engagement profitability is the realization rate—the percentage 
of amounts charged to an engagement (based on actual hours and standard billing rates) that 
actually is billed to the auditee. Some firms also measure performance by using a utilization 
rate—the percentage of total time each professional charges to an engagement. Managers and 
partners sometimes are evaluated based on both their own utilization rate and the rates of the 
staff assigned to them.
40. Managers and partners also may be evaluated according to the number of engagement 
hours or total engagement fees under their management, the amount of other services they sell 
(or are involved in selling), the number of new audit clients they acquire, and their clients’ 
promptness in paying fees. Firms also consider qualitative factors, such as professional 
competence and experience in a targeted industry, when evaluating performance. The use of a 
variety of factors to measure performance is intended to provide a balanced approach to 
meeting a firm’s objectives.
Implications for Firm Cultures and Auditors’ Personal Attributes
41. The question that arises in noting these changes is whether they alter the nature of the 
factors that affect auditor independence and the impact of those factors on audit quality.28
42. Auditing firms spend significant amounts on advertising and marketing, and many firms 
attempt to differentiate themselves by finding and marketing niches in particular lines of 
business or practice specialties. Others emphasize personal service, the expertise the firm can 
provide, the firm’s ability to solve business problems, or an audit process that also measures 
business efficiency and benchmarks the auditee’s operations to those of competitors. These 
“branding efforts” are directed at auditee management—the group that effectively hires 
auditors and consultants—but large sums also are spent on reinforcing these marketing 
strategies and branding slogans within the auditing firm so that firm professionals can 
implement the strategies and internalize a firm culture that may stress auditee satisfaction at 
the expense of audit quality.
28 Research has been conducted that examines the impact of various types of pressures on accountants’ and 
auditors’ attitudes and behavior. That research is summarized in F. Todd DeZoort and Alan T. Lord, “A 
Review and Synthesis of Pressure Effects Research in Accounting,” Journal of Accounting Literature (Vol. 16, 
1997), pp. 28-85.
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43. Concerns have been expressed that, as a result of competition among firms and their 
marketing efforts, auditee managements may come to be viewed primarily as “customers” that 
need to be pleased, with auditor’ responsibilities to users and other stakeholders 
inappropriately deemphasized. Auditee managements also may sense an auditing firm’s desire 
to please its “customers.” Some firms send periodic surveys to auditee managements asking 
for feedback on whether the engagement team met or exceeded auditee management’s 
expectations and provided satisfactory service. Auditing firm management also may meet 
with auditee management to assess “customer” satisfaction. Negative feedback may lead to 
meetings among the engagement partner, the dissatisfied auditee management, and auditing firm 
management. In this environment, auditee management may believe that it has the upper hand, 
and auditors may feel undue pressure to appease auditee management when there is an 
accounting dispute. A requirement to report disagreements to the SEC when an auditing firm 
is replaced  can discourage changing auditing firms, but it does not eliminate the risk of 
intimidation or retaliation by management against an engagement partner or other professionals 
associated with the audit.
29
44. Because auditing firms and the profession have recognized the pressures that auditors 
in the field work under, they have established infrastructures and controls to help auditors 
apply the appropriate personal attributes that are necessary to help ensure quality audits. 
For example, a second partner must concur with important judgments and decisions made on 
audits of public entities, and consultation mechanisms within firms assist engagement partners 
in assessing complex auditing, accounting, and reporting issues. In addition, engagement 
personnel frequently consult informally with other firm professionals as a check on their 
conclusions. These informal networks of advisors and the formal firm decision-making 
process support engagement personnel when they are in conflict with auditee management. In 
some cases, auditing firm management, that is, partners who have no direct responsibility for 
the relationship with the auditee, may participate in determining the firm’s position in such a 
conflict. The intent and the effect are to make the decisions firm matters rather than decisions 
of an individual partner, thereby relieving pressures on the engagement team.
45. Other firm policies and procedures also may serve as signals to partners and staff of 
the firm’s commitment to quality audits. For example, many firms make significant, ongoing 
investments in their audit practice—updating audit methodologies and providing state-of-the- 
art hardware and software that enable auditors to work effectively in a computerized 
environment, have easy access to authoritative accounting and auditing literature and related 
firm publications, and share resources and knowledge. Firms also have developed or acquired 
expertise in specific industries and disciplines, providing engagement teams with a level of 
knowledge and experience appropriate for performing quality audits in a complex business 
environment.
46. Much of this support of audit quality represents an effort to increase auditor 
competence, which can help strengthen auditor independence. It also serves to balance the 
29 SEC Regulation S-K Item 304 (a) and the related instructions to Item 304 (a).
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firm’s emphasis on its marketing and profitability objectives. Significant investments in 
technology and expertise may provide compelling evidence of a firm’s commitment to the 
audit practice. This should help foster a culture where the auditor is confident that the firm 
encourages individuals to maintain the profession’s values—including auditor 
independence—as well as to achieve the firm’s business objectives.
Pressures Arising from Auditors’ Professional Responsibilities
47. In many professional-client relationships (for example, those that exist between 
physicians and their patients or between attorneys and their clients), each party is involved in 
decision making. Nevertheless, the two parties usually are not considered equals, in part 
because of the professional's specialized knowledge and experience. Clients typically must 
rely on the advice of professionals before a final decision is made (for example, about a 
specific medical treatment or line of legal defense). Because clients usually do not have the 
competence to evaluate the professional’s work and advice, professionals have a special 
responsibility to their clients—often called “loyalty” —to ensure that clients’ trust in the 
professionals and reliance on them are justified. In order for the shared decision-making 
process to work effectively, clients must trust professionals to act in the clients’ best 
interests, subject to the limits placed on the professionals because of their responsibilities to 
other individuals and groups (for example, to other clients), to their profession (for example, 
as specified in the Code of Medical Ethics of the American Medical Association [AMA] or 
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct of the American Bar Association  [ABA]), and to 
the public at large (for example, to comply with applicable laws and regulations).
30
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48. An auditor's professional responsibility for loyalty is quite different from the 
responsibility of loyalty to a client described above because of the auditor’s duty to serve the 
public interest. A better analogy may be to a judge’s professional responsibility for ethical 
conduct—to serve the public interest in resolving legal disputes. To meet their professional 
responsibilities, judges are required to “uphold the integrity and independence of the 
judiciary” and to “perform the duties of judicial office impartially and diligently.”  Judges’ 
decisions should rest on their competence and diligence, that is, on their knowledge of 
applicable laws, regulations, and precedents and their ability to apply that knowledge 
properly in a specific case. In addition, judges are required to act without bias or prejudice 
toward individuals or groups. Judicial decisions should not be affected by the potential 
agreement or disagreement of specific individuals or groups, or by judges’ personal interests in 
a specific outcome. As described in the ABA Code of Judicial Conduct:
32
30 Code of Medical Ethics (Chicago: AMA, 1996).
31 Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 3rd ed. (Chicago: ABA, 1996).
32 Code of Judicial Conduct (Chicago: ABA, 1990), Canons 1 and 3.
A judge shall not allow family, social, political or other relationships to influence the 
judge’s judicial conduct or judgment. A judge shall not lend the prestige of judicial 
office to advance the private interests of the judge or others; nor shall a judge convey 
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or permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special position to 
influence the judge.33
33 ABA Code of Judicial Conduct, Section 2B.
34 ABA Code of Judicial Conduct, Section 3B(5).
35 Other professionals have responsibilities that are similar to those of auditors and judges. For example, the 
International Code of Ethics and Standards of Professional Conduct of the Association for Investment 
Management and Research (AIMR) defines investment professionals’ independence as follows: .. advice or 
investment decisions which are the product of an investment professional’s own endeavors, and are not 
influenced by or subject to the control of an issuer of securities, the management of the investment professional’s 
employer, or any other outside sources” (September 1998, para. 1.6). Arbitrators in commercial disputes are 
also expected to be independent: “An arbitrator should decide all matters justly, exercising independent 
judgment, and should not permit outside pressure to affect the decision” (American Arbitration Association, 
Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes [1977], Canon V-B).
36 AICPA Code of Professional Conduct, ET Section 53.01-.02.
A judge shall perform judicial duties without bias or prejudice. A judge shall not, in 
the performance of judicial duties, by words or conduct manifest bias or prejudice, 
including but not limited to bias or prejudice based upon race, sex, religion, national 
origin, disability, age, sexual orientation or socioeconomic status, and shall not permit 
staff, court officials and others subject to the judge’s direction and control to do so.34
49. Like those of judges, auditors’ professional responsibilities require that they base their 
decisions on competent and unbiased assessments, free from pressures from individuals or 
groups that may have a personal interest in specific decisions and free from any emotional, 
financial, and other self-interests that may be served by a specific decision.  The AICPA 
Code of Professional Conduct summarizes those responsibilities as follows:
35
A distinguishing mark of a profession is acceptance of its responsibilities to the public. 
The accounting profession’s public consists of clients, credit grantors, governments, 
employers, investors, the business and financial community, and others who rely on 
the objectivity and integrity of certified public accountants to maintain the orderly 
functioning of commerce. This reliance imposes a public interest responsibility on 
certified public accountants. The public interest is defined as the collective well-being 
of the community of people and institutions the profession serves.
In discharging their professional responsibility, members may encounter conflicting 
pressures from among each of those groups. In resolving those conflicts, members 
should act with integrity, guided by the precept that when members fulfill their 
responsibility to the public, clients’ and employers’ interests are best served.36
50. Because of the environment in which they work, however, auditors are subject to some 
pressures that judges do not face. Judges are elected by the public or are appointed by elected 
representatives of the public to whom they are ultimately responsible. Although judges may 
stand for reelection or reappointment, those decisions are made by the public or its 
representatives. Judges do not have clients who pay their salaries, nor are they retained or 
reappointed by individual clients. Although responsible to serve the public interest, auditors 
may be affected by their firms’ interests in serving and retaining clients. The U.S. Supreme
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Court described an auditor’s professional responsibility and the importance of maintaining 
independence in meeting that responsibility as follows:
... By certifying the public reports that collectively depict a corporation’s financial 
status, the independent auditor assumes a public responsibility transcending any 
employment relationship with the client. The independent public accountant 
performing this special function owes ultimate allegiance to the corporation’s creditors 
and stockholders, as well as to the investing public. This “public watchdog” function 
demands that the accountant maintain total independence from the client at all times 
and requires complete fidelity to the public trust.37
37 U.S. v. Arthur Young & Co. [465 US 805 (1983), pp. 817-18, emphasis in original].
Role of Corporate Governance in Alleviating Pressures on Auditors
51. The combination of various pressures on auditors and an audit environment in which 
judgment is pervasive and evidence is merely persuasive can create an atmosphere in which 
auditee management may attempt to influence an auditor’s judgments. Honest differences of 
opinion between auditee managements and auditors on accounting matters (as well as among 
auditee managements and among auditors) are to be expected, and there is nothing inherently 
wrong with auditee management attempting to convince its auditor that a particular accounting 
treatment is correct. Such attempts, however, may range from bringing relevant accounting 
concepts and standards to the auditor’s attention to intimidating the auditor with threats of 
harmful economic or other consequences unless the auditor accedes to management’s wishes. 
The former is clearly acceptable; the latter is not, because it is an improper attempt to 
pressure the auditor.
52. Various aspects of corporate governance can assist auditors in resisting inappropriate 
pressures from auditee managements, audit committees, and boards and in performing quality 
audits. Among these are:
• an audit committee or board of directors that plays a major role in engaging the 
auditing firm
• an audit committee or board of directors that accepts the responsibility to consider 
management’s choice of accounting principles and estimates and, as part of that 
consideration, to obtain the auditor’s views about the appropriateness of those 
principles and estimates
• an auditee control environment (including the “tone at the top”) that emphasizes a 
commitment to reliable financial reporting and creates an atmosphere in which all 
auditee personnel understand that attempts to intimidate the auditor will not be 
tolerated
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53. An effective audit committee can moderate management attempts to pressure auditors 
into accepting inappropriate accounting treatments.  It also can be a channel of 
communication for the auditor to the full board, thereby helping to ensure that the auditor’s 
positions are heard. Effective audit committees thus can serve as a safeguard to auditor 
independence.
38
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54. Auditors for some time have been required to report various sensitive accounting and 
auditing matters to audit committees, thereby giving committees the opportunity to be 
responsive to those matters.  In 1999 the ISB issued Standard No. 1, which requires auditors 
to report to and discuss with audit committees matters that may reasonably be thought to bear 
on independence.  Effective audit committees use those occasions to evaluate the auditors’ 
independence. To the extent that audit committees take on and meet responsibilities for 
ensuring auditor independence through such evaluations, they also could serve as a safeguard 
to auditor independence. These and other aspects of corporate governance can help to 
discourage pressures on and intimidation of the auditor and also encourage the auditor to resist 
them if they do arise.
40
41
38 Knapp studied a variety of factors that may impact an audit committee’s willingness to support the auditor 
when disagreements arise with auditee management. See Michael C. Knapp, “An Empirical Study of Audit 
Committee Support for Auditors Involved in Technical Disputes with Client Management,” Accounting Review 
(July 1987), pp. 578-88.
39 Suggestions for strengthening the relationship between external auditors and auditees’ boards of directors and 
audit committees were contained in the following reports: Advisory Panel on Auditor Independence, 
Strengthening the Professionalism of the Independent Auditor (Stamford, CT: Public Oversight Board, 1994), 
pp. 12-23; U.S. General Accounting Office, The Accounting Profession—Major Issues: Progress and Concerns 
(Washington, DC: GAO, 1996); Report and Recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the 
Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees (New York: New York Stock Exchange and National Association 
of Securities Dealers, 1999).
40 Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 61, Communication With Audit Committees (AU Section 380). 
Auditors’ other reporting obligations to audit committees cover matters pertaining to internal control, illegal 
acts, and fraud.
41 ISB Standard No. 1, Independence Discussions with Audit Committees (New York: ISB, 1999).
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SECTION III —GOALS OF AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE
55. This section discusses possible goals of auditor independence. That discussion is 
preceded by consideration of personal attributes of individual auditors that many believe help 
ensure quality audits.  Different goals may lead to different definitions, concepts, and basic 
principles of auditor independence.
42
56. The basic question raised by this section is:
42 Appendix B of this DM contains examples of various types of goals of auditor independence that have 
appeared in the auditing literature in addition to those described in this section. Although that literature often 
refers to the objectives of auditor independence, this DM uses the term goals in that context in order to avoid 
confusion with the personal attribute of objectivity discussed in this section.
Question III-1: Which of the goals described in this section should form the 
basis for the goal or goals of auditor independence to be included in a 
conceptual framework? Please explain your views and discuss other goals that 
should be considered.
Personal Auditor Attributes
57. Certain personal attributes of auditors play an essential role in helping to ensure audit 
quality. Judgments and decisions are made by all individuals on an audit team, and audit 
quality can be maintained only if individual auditors at all levels within an auditing firm 
possess appropriate personal attributes and exercise them when performing audits. For 
example, the following personal attributes are discussed in the auditing literature:
• Competence—When applied to an auditor, competence means the ability to 
develop an appropriate audit plan, select suitable auditing procedures to test 
management’s assertions, execute the procedures and evaluate evidence, draw proper 
conclusions regarding the conformity of the financial statements with GAAP, and 
render the appropriate auditor’s report. To perform a quality audit, auditors need a 
wide variety of technical and managerial knowledge and skills. Individual members of 
an audit team will possess such knowledge and skills in varying degrees.
• Diligence—When applied to an auditor, diligence means approaching an audit 
with professional skepticism, efficient and careful handling of technical matters, and a 
willingness to devote adequate time and appropriate effort in performing an audit. 
Diligence sometimes is included as part of an auditor’s responsibility to exercise due 
professional care.
• Integrity—When applied to an auditor, integrity means being honest, trustworthy, 
candid, and truthful in performing an audit and making judgments regarding the 
financial statements’ conformity with GAAP. The AICPA Code of Professional 
Conduct summarizes auditor integrity as follows:
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Integrity is measured in terms of what is right and just. In the absence of specific 
rules, standards, or guidance, or in the face of conflicting opinions, a member 
should test decisions and deeds by asking: “Am I doing what a person of integrity 
would do? Have I retained my integrity?” Integrity requires a member to observe 
both the form and the spirit of technical and ethical standards; circumvention of 
those standards constitutes subordination of judgment.43
43 AICPA Code of Professional Conduct (as of June 1, 1998), ET Section 54.03.
44 One model that describes relationships between auditor independence and the personal attributes of objectivity, 
integrity, and competence and how those attributes may affect audit quality is discussed in Robert K. Elliott and 
Peter D. Jacobson, “In Search of Solutions—SEC Independence Concepts,” CPA Journal (April 1998), pp. 18- 
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• Objectivity—When applied to an auditor, objectivity means being impartial—that 
is, having the ability to suppress any existing biases when obtaining and evaluating 
audit evidence and making audit judgments. Biases may arise from an individual’s 
background, education, and experiences and are part of human nature; therefore, it is 
difficult for anyone to be completely objective. Biases can be both conscious and 
subconscious and also can be either in favor of or against specific things—for example, 
individuals, groups, organizations, ideas, or principles. Auditors must recognize that 
personal prejudice—for example, bias for or against specific auditees or specific 
accounting principles—can endanger the quality of audits by causing biased audit 
judgments. As a result of the potential for bias, various controls (for example, 
mandatory rotation of engagement partners, mandatory concurring partner reviews, 
and other quality control policies and procedures) have been implemented to help 
prevent potential biases from affecting the quality of audits.
58. The above list, while not inclusive of all of the personal attributes that auditors should 
have, illustrates the types of qualities that auditors need in order to perform quality audits.  
The mere possession of these attributes, however, is not sufficient to ensure a quality audit. 
For example, an auditor who is competent might fail to exercise his or her competence in 
making audit decisions in a specific circumstance. Accordingly, to perform a quality audit, an 
auditor should not only possess appropriate personal attributes but also exercise them.
44
59. To acknowledge the role that auditors’ personal attributes play in helping ensure 
quality audits is not to suggest that the ISB’s purview includes all factors that could affect the 
possession and exercise of an auditor’s personal attributes. The ISB’s mission is to develop 
independence standards, not standards for competence, diligence, integrity, objectivity, or 
other personal attributes. These personal attributes are described here because they are 
components of some of the goals of auditor independence discussed later in this section. (A 
formal definition of the term “independence” is not discussed until Section IV because of the 
presumption that such a definition will depend on the goal or goals of independence.)
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Improving Financial Statement Reliability
60. To help ensure that auditors possess and exercise appropriate personal attributes, 
auditing firms have developed and implemented a wide variety of policies and procedures 
(many of which are described in Section II). Firms’ hiring policies, training and continuing 
professional education programs, and “tone at the top” stress the meaning and importance of 
professionalism and the qualities that professional auditors should have. The attributes of 
audit team members are assessed as part of the supervision of audits by a firm’s managers and 
partners, including the various levels of reviews of an audit team’s work and periodic 
performance reviews of individual auditors. In addition, peer reviews of auditing firms include 
evaluations of the overall quality of audits performed by the firm, the work of individual 
auditors, and the firm’s quality controls that are designed to ensure that its personnel have and 
exercise appropriate personal attributes.
61. Some believe that maintaining auditor independence is important because independence 
helps ensure that an auditor can exercise appropriate personal attributes in performing an 
audit. As a result, auditor independence helps ensure audit quality, thereby making it more 
likely that an audit will enhance financial statement reliability. Under this view, a goal of 
auditor independence could express the relationship among independence, an auditor’s 
personal attributes, and improving financial statement reliability. For example:
Goal 1—A goal of auditor independence is to help ensure that auditors are 
willing to exercise appropriate personal attributes when performing audits, 
thereby making it more likely that audits will improve the reliability of 
financial statements.
62. It can be argued that Goal 1 is too broad because it includes all of an auditor’s personal 
attributes. Some believe that independence is related more directly to the possession or 
exercise of objectivity, integrity, or both than it is to other personal attributes, and a goal of 
independence should reflect that closer relationship. For example, the International Federation 
of Accountants (IFAC) recently issued a Discussion Draft containing revisions to its code of 
ethics that states:
Independence requires the qualities of objectivity and integrity. Objectivity is the 
intellectual quality of freedom from bias; integrity is the moral quality of honesty.45
45 Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants (New York: IFAC, August 1999), para. 8.2.
46 (Brussels: FEE, July 1998), p. 8 (footnote omitted).
63. In its Statutory Audit Independence and Objectivity monograph, the Federation Des 
Experts Comptables Europeens (FEE) takes a somewhat different view:
The expression of an objective opinion should always be the ultimate goal of the 
statutory audit. Independence is the main means by which the statutory auditor 
demonstrates that he can perform his task in an objective manner.46
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64. Goal 1 could be modified to emphasize the views that only objectivity, integrity, or 
both are relevant personal attributes. For example, the phrase “willing to exercise appropriate 
personal attributes” in Goal 1 could be replaced by the phrase “willing to exercise objectivity,” 
“willing to exercise integrity,” or “willing to exercise objectivity and integrity.” (These 
modifications also could be made to Goal 3 discussed later in this section.)
65. Users of financial statements and other stakeholders outside the auditing firm cannot 
practicably obtain information directly about auditors’ willingness to exercise appropriate 
personal attributes when performing specific audits. Thus, they must rely on regulators, 
standard setters, and auditing firms to identify activities and relationships with auditees that 
can impair auditor independence. Those groups have concluded that auditors who do not 
engage in such activities or enter into such relationships are more likely to be willing to 
exercise appropriate personal attributes and, as a result, are more likely to perform quality 
audits.
66. An example illustrates how activities or relationships can indicate that an auditor’s 
willingness to exercise appropriate personal attributes might be threatened. Assume that an 
auditor is assigned to an audit team for an auditee whose chief financial officer is the auditor’s 
spouse. In this situation, the spouse’s interest in the audit’s outcome and the auditor’s 
emotional attachment to his or her spouse significantly increase the likelihood that the auditor 
has a personal interest in the audit’s outcome, which is a threat to auditor independence. 
The absence of such a threat would improve the likelihood that the auditor will exercise the 
appropriate personal attributes and perform a quality audit, which would improve financial 
statement reliability.
67. Goal 1 makes explicit the notion that auditor independence helps ensure that auditors 
are willing to exercise appropriate personal attributes in performing audits. It can be argued, 
however, that Goal 1 is inappropriate because there is no way to determine whether it has 
been met. Under this view, a goal of auditor independence should be based on observable 
indicators of an auditor’s potential unwillingness to exercise appropriate personal 
attributes—the existence of activities or relationships that may impair auditor independence. 
One example of a goal based on this view is as follows:
Goal 2—A goal of auditor independence is to help ensure that auditors do not 
engage in activities or have relationships that make it less likely that audits 
will improve the reliability of financial statements.
Enhancing Financial Statement Credibility and Stakeholder Confidence
68. The goals of auditor independence discussed above are based on the assumption that 
the value provided by a quality audit is improved financial statement reliability. Quality 
audits also may add value by enhancing the credibility of financial statements. The Committee 
on Basic Auditing Concepts of the American Accounting Association described the 
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importance of enhanced credibility of, and users’ confidence in, financial statement 
information as follows:
The audit function adds to the credibility of information because the user can ... be 
more confident in using the information for its intended purposes than he would be if 
the audit function had not been performed. This confidence allows the full potential 
value of the accounting information to be realized—for that value is realized through 
the use of the information, not its preparation and dissemination.47
47 American Accounting Association, Committee on Basic Auditing Concepts, A Statement of Basic Auditing 
Concepts (Sarasota, FL: American Accounting Association, 1973), p. 13.
48 Melvin F. Shakun, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Auditing, Research Study No. 3 (New York: Commission on 
Auditors’ Responsibilities, 1978), p. 1.
49 U.S. v. Arthur Young & Co. [465 US 805 (1983), pp. 819-20, note 15].
69. It can be argued that the enhanced credibility of financial statements and users’ and 
other stakeholders’ confidence in financial statement reliability results, in part, from their 
perceptions of reduced information risk that results from quality audits. For example, 
research sponsored by the Commission on Auditors’ Responsibilities noted that
estimated risk is affected not only by actual errors but also by lack of confidence in 
accounting data. By increasing confidence and reducing errors, auditing reduces the 
associated cost of accounting information errors.48
70. Although stakeholders’ perceptions of the reliability of financial statements may be 
affected by many factors, it can be argued that an audit performed by auditors whom users 
and other stakeholders believe are independent is an important source of enhanced financial 
statement credibility and stakeholder confidence. As the U.S. Supreme Court noted, “Public 
faith in the reliability of a corporation’s [audited] financial statements depends upon the 
public perception of the outside auditor as an independent professional.”49
71. Several types of goals could be developed that express the interrelationships among 
stakeholders’ perceptions, an auditor’s personal attributes, certain activities and relationships, 
and auditor independence. For example, one goal could concern the relationship between 
auditor independence and users’ and other stakeholders’ perceptions of an auditor’s personal 
attributes.
Goal 3—A goal of auditor independence is to help ensure that users and other 
stakeholders perceive that auditors are willing to exercise appropriate personal 
attributes when performing audits, thereby making it more likely that audits 
will enhance the credibility of financial statements.
72. Another goal could be based on the relationship between auditor independence and 
activities or relationships that may serve as observable indicators to stakeholders of an 
auditor’s potential inability or unwillingness to exercise those attributes. For example:
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Goal 4—A goal of auditor independence is to help ensure that auditors do not 
engage in activities or have relationships that may be perceived by users and 
other stakeholders as making it less likely that audits will enhance the 
reliability of financial statements.
73. Various individuals and organizations, including some that were cited earlier in this 
section, allude to increased confidence in the financial statements and their reliability as a 
benefit of audits and of auditor independence. It can be argued that both enhanced financial 
statement credibility and increased stakeholder confidence are separate benefits provided by 
an auditor who is perceived by stakeholders as independent and that both benefits should be 
included in the goals of auditor independence. For example, Goal 3 could be modified to 
reflect this view by adding the phrase “and will improve users’ and other stakeholders’ 
confidence in the reliability of financial statements” at the end of the goal. Goal 4 also could 
be modified in a similar manner.
74. As described previously, users and other stakeholders ordinarily cannot ascertain the 
identity of the individual members of the audit team assigned to a specific auditee, their 
personal attributes, or their willingness to exercise appropriate personal attributes when 
performing an audit. As a result, it can be argued that users’ and other stakeholders’ 
perceptions of, and their confidence in, the improved financial statement reliability added by 
an independent auditor may depend on their beliefs about the independence of auditors 
generally and about the effectiveness of the totality of the self-regulatory and public 
regulatory processes, including those concerning auditor independence, that help ensure audit 
quality.  The goals described in this subsection that explicitly mention stakeholders’ 
perceptions could be modified to emphasize this view by replacing the phrase “stakeholders 
perceive that auditors are willing” with the phrase “stakeholders perceive that auditors as a 
group are willing.”
50
50 Carmichael, for example, describes the importance of maintaining the public’s beliefs about the independence 
of auditors as a professional group. See Douglas R. Carmichael, “In Search of Concepts of Auditor 
Independence,” CPA Journal (May 1999), pp. 39-43.
Difficulties with Basing a Goal of Auditor Independence on Stakeholders’ 
Perceptions
75. There is widespread agreement that audits performed by independent auditors enhance 
financial statement credibility and stakeholder confidence in financial statement reliability. 
Nevertheless, it can be argued that those benefits should not be included as separate goals of 
auditor independence in a conceptual framework. Under this view, while financial statement 
credibility and stakeholder confidence may be important to the capital markets, they are not 
self-contained, separately deliverable benefits of an audit apart from improved reliability. 
Generally accepted auditing standards do not require the auditor to undertake any auditing 
procedures aimed at enhancing the financial statements’ credibility—a quality audit is aimed at 
improving financial statement reliability. Enhanced credibility and improved stakeholder 
confidence may be more likely to result from audits performed by independent auditors, but 
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they are not goals that can be usefully distinguished from improved financial statement 
reliability. Elliott and Jacobson describe this view as follows:
The auditor’s contribution is sometimes described as adding credibility to the capital 
markets. Credibility is an important concomitant of auditing, but it is not the core of 
the auditor’s contribution. The core contribution, to repeat, lies in the effects of the 
audit process on the reliability of the information used for decisions. Without 
improved reliability there would be no valid basis for investor confidence in the 
information, and share prices would have less of a relationship to corporate earning 
power. Auditors would indeed be cheerleaders for their clients if their purpose was 
merely or chiefly to overcome the hesitations of investors to engage in transactions 
because of possible management bias in the financial statements. The effect on the 
capital markets would be limited to improving the willingness of capital suppliers to 
enter transactions, with no effect on the relationship between share prices and the 
substance of corporate operations and no effect on the likelihood of returns from 
capital outlays.51
1 Robert T. Elliott and Peter D. Jacobson, “Audit Independence Concepts,” CPA Journal (December 1998), p.
76. The different views about the role of enhanced credibility and stakeholder confidence 
typically center not on whether audits should be designed to enhance those factors but on 
what the relationship is among improved reliability, enhanced credibility, and stakeholder 
confidence in helping ensure effective resource-allocation decisions. The views of those who 
believe that enhanced credibility and stakeholder confidence are conceptually separate from 
improved reliability as goals of auditor independence were described in the preceding 
subsection. Others believe that enhanced credibility and stakeholder confidence are not 
separable from improved reliability as goals of auditor independence.
77. Many who hold the latter view believe that, in the long run, financial statement 
credibility and stakeholder confidence stem from the reliability of financial statements, not 
from stakeholders’ perceptions that they are reliable. Unless financial statements are generally 
reliable, stakeholders eventually will find that their confidence in financial statements is 
misplaced. Financial statements that later are found to be unreliable, despite audits that 
appeared to improve their reliability but failed to do so, cannot serve as a basis for effective 
resource-allocation decisions. If audits do not improve the reliability of financial statements 
generally, those who rely on audited financial statements to help make those decisions may 
grow increasingly skeptical of the value of audits. Accordingly, those who hold this view 
believe that improved financial statement reliability is the primary value provided by an audit 
and that enhanced credibility is not separable from improved reliability in the long run because 
enhanced credibility cannot long endure if reliability is not present. Under this view, goals of 
auditor independence that concern financial statement credibility or stakeholder confidence are 
not appropriate because they suggest that enhancing financial statement credibility or 
improving stakeholder confidence is an important goal in its own right rather than the result of 
increased financial statement reliability.
32.
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78. Another concern expressed by those who do not consider enhancing financial statement 
credibility or improving stakeholder confidence as a separable goal of auditor independence is 
the difficulty of deciding whose perceptions should be included when judging whether 
credibility is enhanced or confidence is improved. As discussed in Section II, there are many 
different groups of stakeholders in auditor independence. Different groups, and different 
individuals within those groups, are likely to have different perceptions because such 
perceptions are based on a wide variety of factors, including beliefs about the financial 
reporting system, about auditing firms and the auditing profession, and about the systems of 
public regulation and self-regulation.  Accordingly, those who hold this view also may 
believe that a goal of auditor independence based on stakeholders’ perceptions is 
inappropriate because it is too difficult to judge when such a goal has been met.
52
52 The issue of whose perceptions should be considered by the ISB in developing standards of auditor 
independence is discussed in Section VII.
* * * *
79. Goals 1 and 2 focus on auditor independence and its relationship to financial statement 
reliability without including the notion that auditor independence may contribute to enhancing 
stakeholders’ perceptions of financial statement reliability. As a result, these goals lead to 
definitions, concepts, and basic principles of auditor independence that include the potential 
effects on audit quality and on financial statement reliability of threats to auditor 
independence but do not include stakeholders’ perceptions of those factors. Goals of auditor 
independence that include enhanced financial statement credibility or increased stakeholder 
confidence, such as Goals 3 and 4 and the related modifications, lead to definitions, concepts, 
and basic principles of auditor independence that do include how users and other stakeholders 
perceive factors related to auditor independence. Examples of both types of definitions, 
concepts, and basic principles are discussed in Sections IV-VII.
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SECTION IV—DEFINING AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE
80. A definition derived from the goals of auditor independence would serve as a 
fundamental building block on which other components of a conceptual framework could rest 
and would provide stakeholders with a common language for discussion and debate. This 
section discusses alternative definitions of auditor independence based on the goals described 
in Section III.53
81. The basic question raised by this section is:
53 Appendix C of this DM contains examples of different types of definitions of auditor independence that have 
appeared in the auditing literature in addition to those described in this section.
54 In answering this question, some respondents may wish to comment on several of the specific alternatives 
described in this section. A suggested format for structuring those comments can be found at the end of the 
section.
Question IV-1: Which of the alternatives described in this section should form 
the basis for a definition of auditor independence to be included in a conceptual 
framework? Please explain your views and discuss other definitions or 
approaches to defining auditor independence that should be considered.54
Definitions Based On Improving Financial Statement Reliability
82. A definition of auditor independence based on the goal of improving financial statement 
reliability could be based on various approaches, two of which are included in this DM. The 
first—called the “personal attributes approach”—defines independence in terms of pressures 
that could affect an auditor’s willingness to exercise appropriate personal attributes. The 
second—called the “activities and relationships approach”—defines independence in terms of 
certain circumstances that might serve as observable external indicators of such pressure. This 
subsection describes examples of formal definitions of auditor independence using each 
approach.
Personal Attributes Approach
83. It can be argued that independence is a desirable personal attribute—similar to the 
attributes of competence, diligence, integrity, and objectivity discussed in Section III—that 
auditors should have and exercise during an audit. A definition consistent with this view could 
describe the personal attribute of independence and, based on Goal 1, would identify the role 
of independence in helping to ensure a quality audit. For example:
Definition 1-—Independence is freedom from pressures and other factors that 
impair an auditor’s willingness to perform a quality audit.
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84. It can be argued that Definition 1 is inadequate or incomplete because it does not make 
clear that the pressures and other factors that may impair auditor independence are those that 
may affect the auditor’s willingness to exercise appropriate personal attributes. It also can be 
argued that independence is not a separable personal attribute but is a state of mind that helps 
ensure that an auditor has the willingness to exercise appropriate personal attributes when 
performing an audit. A description of this view can be found in Mautz and Sharaf's The 
Philosophy of Auditing.
[One important phase of auditor independence] is the independence of approach and 
attitude which any professional man should have if he is engaged in truly professional 
work. This is a combination of self-reliance, freedom from client control, expert skill 
and ability, and considered judgment based on training and experience not available to 
those who are not members of the profession.55
55 Robert K. Mautz and Hussein A. Sharaf, The Philosophy of Auditing (American Accounting Association, 
1961), pp. 230-31.
56 Restatement of the Code of Professional Ethics, p. 8.
85. A definition of independence could describe the relationship between auditor 
independence and an auditor’s willingness to exercise appropriate personal attributes. For 
example:
Definition 2-—Independence is freedom from pressures and other factors that 
impair an auditor’s willingness to exercise appropriate personal attributes 
when performing an audit.
86. As discussed in Section III, it can be argued that independence is related more directly 
to either objectivity, integrity, or both than it is to other personal attributes and that the 
definition of independence should reflect that closer relationship. For example, the now- 
superseded AICPA Code of Professional Ethics defined independence as follows:
Independence has traditionally been defined by the profession as the ability to act with 
integrity and objectivity.56
87. A definition of independence that describes the relationship between the personal 
attributes of objectivity and integrity and auditor independence could be expressed as follows:
Definition 3-—Independence is freedom from pressures and other factors that 
impair an auditor’s willingness to exercise objectivity and integrity when 
performing an audit.
Similar definitions could be developed using either “objectivity” or “integrity” by itself instead 
of both attributes together.
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Activities and Relationships Approach
88. Section III suggests that most stakeholders have no way to determine an individual 
auditor’s integrity, objectivity, or other personal attributes or to assess when an auditor has 
the willingness to exercise those attributes. Therefore, although Definitions 1, 2, and 3 may be 
appropriate theoretical constructs for auditor independence, they may not be suitable for a 
conceptual framework because they are vague about the sources of the pressures on an 
auditor. In other words, they may not be as operational as they could be because they do not 
include observable external indicators of factors that may affect an auditor’s willingness to 
exercise appropriate personal attributes when performing an audit.
89. This view is consistent with the notion that certain activities and relationships indicate 
that an auditor’s willingness to perform a quality audit (i.e., exercise appropriate personal 
attributes) may be impaired. Rule 2-01 of the SEC's Regulation S-X is consistent with that 
view and states, in part:
(b) The Commission will not recognize any certified public accountant or public 
accountant as independent who is not in fact independent. For example, an accountant 
will be considered not independent with respect to any person or any of its parents, 
its subsidiaries, or other affiliates (1) in which, during the period of his professional 
engagement to examine the financial statements being reported on or at the date of his 
report, he, his firm, or a member of his firm had, or was committed to acquire, any 
direct financial interest or any material indirect financial interest; (2) with which, during 
the period of his professional engagement to examine the financial statements being 
reported on, at the date of his report, or during the period covered by the financial 
statements, he, his firm, or a member of his firm was connected as a promoter, 
underwriter, voting trustee, director, officer, or employee....
(c) In determining whether an accountant may in fact be not independent with respect 
to a particular person, the Commission will give appropriate consideration to all 
relevant circumstances, including evidence bearing on all relationships between the 
accountant and that person or any affiliate thereof, and will not confine itself to the 
relationships existing in connection with the filing of reports with the Commission.57
90. Underlying this approach to defining auditor independence is the assumption that 
auditors who are free of certain activities and relationships are presumed to be more willing to 
exercise appropriate personal attributes and perform an audit that improves financial 
statement reliability. The following definitions of auditor independence are based on an 
activities and relationships approach. They modify Definitions 1, 2, and 3 by replacing the 
phrase “freedom from pressures and other factors” with the phrase “the absence of certain 
activities and relationships” and the addition of the word “may.” These modifications reflect 
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57 SEC Regulation S-X, Section 210.2-01.
this approach’s focus on observable external indicators of circumstances in which auditor 
independence might be impaired.
Definition 4—Independence is the absence of certain activities and 
relationships that may impair an auditor’s willingness to perform a quality 
audit.
Definition 5—Independence is the absence of certain activities and 
relationships that may impair an auditor’s willingness to exercise appropriate 
personal attributes when performing an audit.
Definition 6—Independence is the absence of certain activities and 
relationships that may impair an auditor’s willingness to exercise objectivity 
and integrity when performing an audit.58
58 This definition could be modified in the same ways suggested previously for Definition 3.
59 Because of the wide variety of stakeholders in auditor independence, it is likely that different perceptions of 
auditor independence will exist. The definitions in this section do not suggest which stakeholder groups should 
be considered when perceptions are being discussed. The basic principle described in Section VII deals with that 
question.
60 An alternative method for including stakeholders’ perceptions in a conceptual framework is to adopt a 
definition of auditor independence that excludes stakeholders’ perceptions but to include a basic principle that 
describes the need for standard setters and others to consider such perceptions, as well as improved financial 
statement credibility and stakeholders’ confidence in financial statement reliability, in the process of developing 
auditor independence standards. This alternative is discussed in Section V.
Definitions That Include Stakeholders’ Perceptions
91. The definitions in the previous subsection do not include stakeholders’ perceptions of 
factors related to auditor independence.  As discussed in Section III, however, it can be 
argued that the goals of auditor independence also include enhancing financial statement 
credibility and improving stakeholder confidence. Because these two goals are based on 
stakeholders’ perceptions, a definition of auditor independence that is consistent with those 
goals could include explicitly stakeholders’ perceptions of factors related to auditor 
independence.  One way to do that is to modify the wording of Definitions 1, 2, and 3. 
Definitions 7, 8, and 9 illustrate a “personal attributes” approach that includes stakeholders’ 
perceptions.
59
60
Definition 7—Independence is freedom from pressures and other factors that 
impair, or are perceived to impair, an auditor’s willingness to perform a quality 
audit.
Definition 8-—Independence is freedom from pressures and other factors that 
impair, or are perceived to impair, an auditor’s willingness to exercise 
appropriate personal attributes when performing an audit.
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Definition 9-—Independence is freedom from pressures and other factors that 
impair, or are perceived to impair, an auditor’s willingness to exercise 
objectivity and integrity when performing an audit.
92. Some may believe that Definitions 7, 8, and 9 are appropriate theoretical constructs, 
but an operational definition for purposes of a conceptual framework should include activities 
and relationships that indicate an auditor’s willingness to perform a quality audit. Definitions 
10, 11, and 12 illustrate an “activities and relationships” approach that includes stakeholders’ 
perceptions.
Definition 10—Independence is the absence of certain activities and 
relationships that may impair, or may be perceived to impair, an auditor’s 
willingness to perform a quality audit.
Definition 11—Independence is the absence of certain activities and 
relationships that may impair, or may be perceived to impair, an auditor’s 
willingness to exercise appropriate personal attributes when performing an 
audit.
Definition 12—Independence is the absence of certain activities and 
relationships that may impair, or may be perceived to impair, an auditor’s 
willingness to exercise objectivity and integrity when performing an audit.61
61 As noted previously, definitions that include both “objectivity” and “integrity” could be modified to 
accommodate the views that (a) only “objectivity” or “integrity,” by itself, is the appropriate personal attribute 
in this context and (b) independence relates to the possession of one or both of these attributes, rather than the 
willingness to exercise them.
93. As discussed in Section III, it can be argued that enhanced financial statement 
credibility and increased stakeholder confidence are based on stakeholders’ perceptions of 
auditors as a group. That relationship could be included in any of the preceding definitions 
that include stakeholders’ perceptions by changing the phrase “an auditor’s willingness” to 
“the willingness of auditors as a group.”
* * * *
94. The goals in Section III and the alternative definitions discussed in this section can be 
used to derive various concepts and basic principles of auditor independence. Sections V-VII 
discuss those elements of a conceptual framework.
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For respondents:
95. The following definition illustrates how the alternatives described in this section could 
be combined.
Independence is freedom from pressures and other factors—indicated by certain 
activities or relationships—that may impair, or may be perceived to impair, the 
willingness of auditors, both individually and as a group, to exercise appropriate 
personal attributes (including objectivity and integrity) when performing an 
audit.
96. The chart below lists each element of the definition in paragraph 95. Do you believe 
that a definition of auditor independence should include reference to those elements? Use the 
chart in formulating your response to Question IV-1 if you believe it would be helpful.
Yes/No______Comments
Freedom from pressures and other factors
Absence of certain activities or relationships
An auditor’s willingness to exercise 
appropriate personal attributes
Willingness of auditors as a group to 
exercise appropriate personal attributes
Perceptions of auditors’ willingness to 
exercise appropriate personal attributes
Auditor objectivity
Auditor integrity
Other elements (please describe):
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SECTION V—AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE CONCEPTS
97. The definitions of independence in Section IV assume that certain factors—referred to 
as threats to auditor independence—may have a negative effect on auditor behavior. The 
possibility that a negative effect will result suggests the existence of risk—referred to as 
independence risk—that a threat may impair auditor independence. One or more
controls—referred to as safeguards to auditor independence—could be instituted, however, to 
reduce independence risk. This section discusses the concepts of independence risk, threats, 
safeguards, the significance of threats, and the effectiveness of safeguards. It also considers 
whether stakeholder perceptions and benefits and costs of auditor independence should be 
included as concepts of auditor independence.
98. The basic question raised by this section is:
Question V-1: Do you believe that the concepts discussed in this section 
—independence risk, threats to auditor independence and their significance, 
safeguards to auditor independence and their effectiveness, stakeholders’ 
perceptions in independence considerations, and benefits and costs of auditor 
independence—are useful and should be included in a conceptual framework? 
What other concepts, if any, would be useful? Please explain your views.
Addressing Auditor Independence Issues
99. Many factors in the audit environment help to ensure quality audits. Some apply to 
individual auditors (such as timely participation in continuing professional education 
programs), others concern auditing firms (such as implementing effective systems of quality 
control), and others are part of the systems of public regulation and self-regulation of the 
auditing profession (such as mandatory peer reviews of auditing firms).
100. Pressures on auditors and other factors can have a negative effect on audit quality. 
Some are common to many professions, others arise because of the unique professional 
environment in which auditors work, and still others may affect an individual auditor in one or 
more specific circumstances. Those factors, however, do not necessarily affect audit quality, 
in part because various controls have been developed by auditing firms and public regulatory 
and self-regulatory bodies.
101. Furthermore, many of the factors that negatively affect audit quality are not directly 
related to auditor independence. For example, some auditees are now using complex financial 
instruments to manage risks. Auditors unfamiliar with those instruments and the required 
accounting may not detect related accounting errors. Although factors such as these may have 
a significant impact on audit quality, they do not involve independence issues. The ISB and 
other stakeholders must, therefore, address two questions, either explicitly or implicitly, when 
they consider various factors that could affect audit quality.
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• Do the issues under consideration relate to an auditor’s independence (as opposed 
to other factors that could affect audit quality)?
• If so, what is the likelihood that an auditor’s independence is impaired?
102. The rest of this section discusses an approach to addressing these questions using 
various concepts of auditor independence.
Independence Risk
103. Independence risk can be thought of as the risk that, in a particular circumstance, an 
auditor’s independence may be impaired. A more precise definition of independence risk 
depends on the definition of independence adopted in the conceptual framework. Each of the 
definitions discussed in Section IV could serve as the basis for a more precise definition of 
independence risk. For example:
• Independence risk is the risk that pressures and other factors impair an auditor’s 
willingness to perform a quality audit. (consistent with Definition 1 of auditor 
independence in Section IV—personal attributes approach)
• Independence risk is the risk that an activity or relationship may impair an 
auditor’s willingness to exercise appropriate personal attributes when performing an 
audit, (consistent with Definition 5—activities and relationships approach)
104. Independence risk is increased when new factors are introduced that could impair 
auditor independence. Those factors are defined in this DM as threats to auditor 
independence. Independence risk is reduced when controls—including prohibitions, 
restrictions, disclosures, and other policies and procedures, working singly or in 
combination—mitigate or eliminate threats to auditor independence. Those controls—defined 
in this DM as safeguards to auditor independence—exist in the environment in which audits 
are performed or are put in place by regulators, standard setters, or firms in response to 
threats to auditor independence.
105. Threats to auditor independence arise from numerous and diverse pressures, activities, 
and relationships, and they may emerge in a wide variety of circumstances. Because they may 
increase independence risk and lower the quality of audits, threats need to be analyzed 
carefully.
106. Identifying and classifying the types of threats posed in specific circumstances and the 
types of safeguards in place may help the ISB and other stakeholders better understand the 
independence risk that those circumstances may pose. Classifying threats and safeguards also 
may provide a common language for the ISB and other stakeholders to use in discussing 
specific independence issues. It also may assist the ISB in developing a general approach to 
analyzing independence risk that could help ensure an internally consistent set of 
independence standards.
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Significance of Threats and Effectiveness of Safeguards
107. Assessing independence risk requires analyzing the significance (or strength) of threats 
to auditor independence posed by a given set of circumstances and the effectiveness of the 
safeguards that are, or could be put, in place to mitigate or eliminate a particular threat. 
Because of the large number of potential threats and safeguards that are not susceptible to 
quantification, this DM employs the general terms “significance of threats” and “effectiveness 
of safeguards,” rather than “materiality,” which is more frequently associated with 
quantitative measures or guidelines. Some threats and safeguards are susceptible to 
quantification, however, and the ISB may determine that their significance and effectiveness 
can be evaluated, in whole or in part, by reference to numeric benchmarks.
108. The significance of a threat in a particular set of circumstances is a function of many 
factors. A particular threat could have vastly different effects on independence risk depending 
on such factors as the force with which pressure is exerted, the stature of the person exerting 
the pressure, the stature of the auditor who is being pressured, the strength of the auditor’s 
integrity, and the importance of the matter that is the subject of the pressure'. The 
effectiveness of a safeguard depends on whether it is suitably designed to meet its objective, 
how it is applied, the consistency with which it is applied, by whom it is applied, and to 
whom it is applied.62
109. Independence may be viewed as a quality or a condition that an auditor has in varying 
degrees ranging from being “clearly independent” to being “clearly not independent.” Under 
that view, the level of independence risk can be thought of as a position on a continuum that 
ranges from “no risk of impaired independence” to “certainty of impaired independence.”  
The following definitions of significance and effectiveness in an independence context are 
consistent with this view:
63
62 These are the same factors that are described in AU Section 319, Consideration of Internal Control in a 
Financial Statement Audit, as determinants of the effectiveness of the design and operation of internal control 
generally; safeguards are one type of control.
63 It also can be argued that independence is not a quality or a condition that an auditor has in varying degrees 
but, instead, is something that an auditor either has or does not have. Under that view, only two levels of 
independence risk exist—it is either acceptable (i.e., the auditor is independent) or unacceptable (i.e., the auditor 
is not independent). Unlike an observable condition, however, an auditor’s independence cannot be directly 
observed by others. As a result, judgment must be relied on to assess whether an auditor is, or is likely to be, 
independent in a specific situation. The judgments of different individuals are likely to result in varying levels of 
beliefs about auditor independence, the level of independence risk created in various circumstances, and the 
acceptability of that level of independence risk. These two views on the nature of independence, therefore, may 
be functionally equivalent—in both cases, independence risk can best be thought of as positions on a continuum. 
This DM avoids the terms “unacceptable” or “acceptable” when referring to levels of independence risk because 
those terms imply that independence risk can be described only as one of two alternative levels rather than as 
consisting of points along a continuum. Respondents to the DM are encouraged to comment on whether they 
agree with the appropriateness of this decision.
A threat to independence is significant if the threat increases independence risk to an 
unacceptably high level (i.e., the likelihood of impaired independence is too high).
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A safeguard to independence is effective if the safeguard reduces independence risk to 
an acceptably low level (i.e., the likelihood of impaired independence is sufficiently 
low).
110. These definitions of significance and effectiveness imply the need to judge, for a given 
set of circumstances, where along the independence risk continuum the level of independence 
risk becomes unacceptably high. That point will be a matter of judgment for the individual or 
group that is assessing independence risk in a specific situation.
Stakeholders’ Perceptions in Independence Considerations
111. Different views concerning the desirability of including stakeholders’ perceptions in 
the goals and definition of auditor independence are discussed in Sections III and IV. If 
stakeholders’ perceptions are included in those goals or definition, the ISB will need to 
consider a third question, in addition to the two discussed previously in this section, when it 
addresses auditor independence issues:
• What is the likelihood that stakeholders would perceive that an auditor’s 
independence is impaired?
112. Two approaches can be used to address this question. The first would be to include 
stakeholders’ perceptions in the definition of the term “auditor independence.” Because the 
definition of independence risk is based on the definition of independence, this approach also 
would result in including stakeholders’ perceptions in assessments of independence risk. 
Those assessments would, as a result, be based on both the likelihood that an auditor’s 
independence may be impaired and the likelihood that stakeholders would perceive that 
independence may be impaired. The following examples illustrate how some of the definitions 
of auditor independence in Section IV (i.e., those that include stakeholders’
perceptions—Definitions 7-12) could serve as the basis for a definition of independence risk 
that included stakeholders’ perceptions (the italicized words are additions to the definitions of 
independence risk discussed previously). If the ISB were to assess independence risk using 
one of these definitions, it would need to consider stakeholders’ perceptions of auditor 
independence in the specific circumstances under consideration in addition to (a) the existence 
and significance of the threats posed in specific circumstances and (b) the existence and 
effectiveness of safeguards that eliminate or mitigate those threats.
• Independence risk is the risk that pressures and other factors impair, or are 
perceived to impair, an auditor’s willingness to perform a quality audit, (consistent 
with Definition 7 of auditor independence in Section IV—personal attributes 
approach)
• Independence risk is the risk that an activity or relationship may impair, or may be 
perceived to impair, an auditor’s willingness to exercise appropriate personal attributes 
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when performing an audit, (consistent with Definition 11—activities and relationships 
approach)
113. A second way for the ISB to consider stakeholders’ perceptions when examining 
auditor independence issues is to adopt a definition of independence (and therefore a definition 
of independence risk) in the conceptual framework that does not include stakeholders’ 
perceptions but to include those perceptions when the acceptability of the level of 
independence risk is assessed. Section VII discusses such an approach.
Benefits and Costs of Auditor Independence
114. There are benefits and costs of auditor independence to many of the various 
stakeholders in auditor independence.  Consideration of those benefits and costs may be 
relevant when the ISB and others evaluate the level of independence risk.
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64 Benefits and costs to society generally are sometimes referred to as social benefits and costs; benefits and costs 
to specific individuals, groups, or organizations—such as auditors, auditing firms, and the auditing 
profession—are referred to as private benefits and costs. This distinction, however, is difficult to draw in the case 
of auditor independence because some private benefits and costs may be diffused throughout society, thereby 
becoming social costs and benefits. This DM, therefore, does not attempt to categorize benefits and costs of 
auditor independence as social or private.
Benefits of Auditor Independence
115. The benefits of auditor independence can be expressed in terms of helping to ensure 
quality audits and financial statement reliability, lowering the cost of capital to auditees by 
reducing the premium that investors and creditors demand as compensation for assuming 
information risk, and increasing the effectiveness of the capital markets in allocating resources. 
Maintaining auditor independence also may help reduce litigation and related costs to auditees 
and auditors resulting from alleged and actual situations involving unreliable financial 
statements. Independence also may enhance the reputational capital of individual auditors, 
auditing firms, and the auditing profession as a whole—an important factor in maintaining the 
confidence of stakeholders in auditor independence. Individuals and auditing firms with 
reputations for high-quality audits may be able to “leverage” those reputations and help the 
firms retain existing clients, attract new clients, and charge higher fees.
Costs of Auditor Independence
116. Costs of auditor independence include costs of developing, applying, maintaining, 
monitoring, and enforcing safeguards. Those costs include the costs to auditees and other 
stakeholders associated with various safeguards—for example, the cost of foregone economies 
of scope when firms are proscribed from providing certain types of services to auditees and 
the potential reduction in audit efficiency resulting from the rotation of audit partners. There 
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are also costs associated with the system of public regulation and self-regulation of auditor 
independence—for example, the expenses incurred by state and federal regulators and 
standard-setting bodies, much of which is underwritten, directly or indirectly, by auditing 
firms. Other costs of auditor independence relate to the costs incurred by individual auditors 
and auditing firms associated with administering and complying with independence rules and 
regulations. In addition, income may be lost by individual auditors (and their families) and by 
auditing firms as a result of prohibitions against or restrictions on various activities and 
relationships imposed by standard setters, regulators, or auditing firms. There also may be 
costs related to reductions in audit quality that may result if less competent individuals are 
attracted to the profession because of independence rules—for example, if restrictions against 
auditors’ investments in auditees reduce the pool of high quality entry-level individuals.
Measuring Benefits and Costs
117. The benefits of auditor independence in the form of more effective resource-allocation 
decisions and auditees’ reduced cost of capital are not easily measured. Benefits that may be 
reaped by auditors in the form of reduced litigation and enhanced reputational capital are also 
difficult to quantify.
118. Some of the costs of auditor independence may be measurable—for example, the costs 
of maintaining and monitoring independence rules and policies and costs related to the 
operations of professional associations, standard setters, and oversight bodies. These costs 
may be measured by the amounts expended by auditing firms and by bodies responsible for 
regulating auditors, but allocating those amounts to issues involving independence or to 
specific safeguards to auditor independence is a difficult, if not impossible, task. The costs 
related to foregone economies of scope and reduced audit quality also are extremely difficult to 
measure.
119. Clearly, judgment, rather than precise measurement, will need to be used if the ISB and 
others include costs and benefits when they consider issues of auditor independence. In fact, 
the difficulties of identifying and measuring the relevant benefits and costs may suggest to 
some that the ISB should not attempt to do so. Section VI discusses a basic principle 
concerning the role that benefits and costs could play when the ISB develops independence 
standards.
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SECTION VI —BASIC PRINCIPLES OF AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE: 
ANALYZING THREATS AND SAFEGUARDS
120. This section examines basic principles related to threats and safeguards that can be 
used to analyze the independence of auditors in a wide variety of circumstances and can serve 
as guidelines for the ISB when it develops standards for auditor independence. Section VII 
discusses an additional basic principle dealing with how the ISB could include stakeholders’ 
perceptions in its standard-setting process.
121. The basic questions raised by this section are:
Question VI-1: Do you believe that the principles described in this section will 
be useful to the ISB in developing future standards? Please explain your views 
and discuss other types of guidance that you believe would make the conceptual 
framework more useful to the ISB or to other stakeholders.
Question VI-2: Do you believe that it is useful to analyze threats based on their 
nature and significance? Please explain your views and discuss types of threats 
other than those identified in this section that should be considered in a 
conceptual framework for auditor independence.
Question VI-3: Do you believe that it is useful to analyze safeguards based on 
their type and effectiveness? Please explain your views and discuss types of 
safeguards other than those identified in this section that should be considered 
in a conceptual framework for auditor independence.
Question VI-4: Do you believe that the ISB should consider which individuals 
in an auditing firm (as well as the firm itself) are affected by one or more 
threats to auditor independence in the specific circumstances under 
consideration and by one or more safeguards that effectively mitigate or 
eliminate those threats? Please explain your views.
Question VI-5: Do you believe that the ISB should weigh the costs of alternative 
safeguards against the benefits of reduced independence risk resulting from 
those safeguards when it develops new independence standards? Why or why 
not? Please discuss your views about how the ISB should measure the costs and 
benefits of alternative safeguards.
Threats to Auditor Independence
122. The first step in analyzing the independence of auditors, based on the concepts 
described in Section V, involves identifying potential threats to auditor independence that arise 
in specific circumstances. Identifying potential threats is important because threats represent 
sources of independence risk—that is, they increase the likelihood that an auditor’s 
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independence may be impaired. Two basic principles of auditor independence related to the 
identification and analysis of threats are described below.
Threat Identification
123. Considerable research has addressed the circumstances that represent potential sources 
of threats to auditor independence. Researchers have considered many environmental and 
situational variables—such as the nature of the relationship between auditors and auditees, the 
types and extent of non-audit services provided to auditees, the size of fees for both audit and 
non-audit services, the existence and nature of available authoritative guidance pertaining to 
accounting issues, and the systems by which auditing firms compensate and promote their 
employees.65
124. Researchers also have studied the effects on auditor independence of various pressures 
and other factors. This research considers the processes by which auditors’ judgments are 
formed and decisions are made and the variables related to auditor independence that may 
influence those judgments and decisions. These studies have found that an auditor’s ability to 
maintain his or her independence in specific circumstances is based on the interactions among 
different types of variables, including:
• auditors’ personal attributes and beliefs, such as their integrity and their level of 
ethical development
• cultural characteristics of the auditing firm in which auditors work, which stem, in 
part, from firm leadership
• contextual variables that depend on the specific circumstances faced by an auditor 
that may affect the relative “bargaining power” of an auditor and an auditee—for 
example, economic factors such as the financial health of the auditee, the size of the 
audit fee, and the existence and size of fees for non-audit services
125. The results of this research suggest that the judgments and decisions of auditors, when 
faced with potential threats to their independence, are likely to be affected by a wide variety
65 Some of the research on auditor independence has involved developing analytical models that examine 
theoretical relationships between auditor independence and various factors, such as audit pricing and non-audit 
services. The predictions of some of these models have been examined in subsequent studies to test whether the 
hypothesized relationships affect auditors’ judgments and decisions. A summary of those models and related 
empirical research can be found in Gary Kleinman, Dan Palmon, and Asokan Anandarajan, “Auditor 
Independence: A Synthesis of Theory and Empirical Research,” in Gary J. Previts, Thomas R. Robinson, and 
Nandani Chandar (Eds.), Research in Accounting Regulation, Vol. 12 (Stamford, CT: JAI Press, 1998), pp. 3- 
42.
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of pressures and other factors, and different auditors are likely to react to a specific set of 
circumstances in different ways.66
66 Carolyn A. Windsor and Neal M. Ashkanasy, “The Effect of Client Management Bargaining Power, Moral 
Reasoning Development, and Belief in a Just World on Auditor Independence,” Accounting, Organizations and 
Society (Vol. 21, 1995), pp. 701-20.
67This type of threat is similar to an information processing bias identified in the behavioral science literature as 
the “self-serving bias.” People do not process information perfectly, and one common imperfection is the 
tendency to prefer outcomes that serve an individual’s own self-interests. Bazerman, Morgan, and Lowenstein 
summarize research in this area and suggest that the bias is a result of people’s tendency to view information and 
arguments that support their own self-interests as being more persuasive than those supporting other positions. 
This bias in interpreting evidence in favor of a position that supports an individual’s self-interests may limit an 
auditor’s ability to gather and interpret audit evidence objectively. The authors suggest that even for an auditor 
with a high degree of integrity, this inherent self-serving bias, and thus self-interest threat, is likely to remain an. 
issue in connection with auditor independence (Max H. Bazerman, Kimberly P. Morgan, and George F. 
Lowenstein, “The Impossibility of Auditor Independence,” Sloan Management Review [Summer 1997], pp. 89- 
94). Burke, however, argues that auditors’ self-serving bias actually helps support auditor independence. He 
suggests that this occurs because of the “positive consequences” if auditors maintain their independence (such as 
performing quality audits, which result in their receiving rewards from their firms) and the “negative 
consequences” of their not doing so (such as losing their jobs or harming their firms) (W. Warner Burke, 
“Auditor Independence: An Organizational Psychology Perspective,” in AICPA, Serving the Public Interest: A 
New Conceptual Framework for Auditor Independence [White Paper] (New York: AICPA, 1997), Appendix C, 
p. 9).
126. Regulatory bodies in the United States, including the SEC and the AICPA, as well as 
organizations outside the United States, have developed independence rules and 
interpretations concerning specific circumstances that they believe may create threats to 
auditor independence—for example:
• financial interests between an auditor and an auditee—such as financial 
investments, loans, joint ventures, and unpaid fees
• services provided to an auditee deemed incompatible with an auditor’s role—such 
as bookkeeping and related professional services
• business relationships with an auditee—such as acting as an officer, director, 
underwriter, broker/dealer, or trustee
• personal or family relationships with an auditee
• actual or threatened litigation between an auditor and an auditee
127. Threats to auditor independence created in the kinds of circumstances described above 
can be classified based on the general nature of the threats—for example:
• Self-interest threat—a threat that arises from an auditor acting in his or her own 
interest.  Self-interests include an auditor’s emotional, financial, or other personal 
interests. An auditor may favor, consciously or subconsciously, those self-interests 
over his or her interest in performing a quality audit. For example, auditors’ 
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relationships with auditees create a financial self-interest because auditees pay the fees, 
both for audit and for any non-audit services performed for them. An auditor also 
would have a financial self-interest if he or she owned stock in an auditee or an 
emotional self-interest if an employment relationship existed between the auditor’s 
spouse and an auditee. Various types of safeguards may mitigate or eliminate self­
interest threats, such as prohibitions against certain financial interests and family 
relationships between auditors and auditees, restrictions on the percentage of total firm 
fees earned from one auditee, and auditing firm disclosures to audit committees of fees 
for audit and non-audit services.
• Self-review threat—a threat that arises from an auditor reviewing his or her own 
work or the work done by others in the auditor’s firm. It is more difficult to evaluate 
without bias one’s own work, or that of one’s firm, than the work of someone else or 
of some other firm. Therefore, a self-review threat exists when an auditor reviews 
judgments and decisions made by the auditor or by the auditor’s firm. Safeguards that 
may mitigate or eliminate self-review threats include concurring partner and peer 
reviews, firewalls, and prohibitions against auditors acting in the capacity of auditee 
management.
• Advocacy threat—a threat that arises from an auditor acting as an advocate for or 
against an auditee’s position or opinion rather than as an unbiased attestor. An 
advocacy threat is present, for example, if an auditor acts as an underwriter or 
broker/dealer for an auditee’s securities. An advocacy threat also may be present if an 
auditor takes a position against an auditee, such as in litigation between an auditee and 
an auditing firm. Safeguards that may mitigate or eliminate advocacy threats include 
prohibitions against and limitations on auditors providing certain non-audit services for 
auditees that involve advocacy roles.
• Familiarity (or trust) threat—a threat that arises from an auditor being influenced 
by a close relationship with an auditee. A familiarity threat is present if an auditor is 
not sufficiently skeptical of an auditee’s assertions and, as a result, too readily adopts 
an auditee’s viewpoint because of his or her familiarity with or trust in the auditee. 
For example, a familiarity threat may exist when an auditor has a particularly close or 
long-standing personal or professional relationship with an auditee. Safeguards that 
may mitigate or eliminate familiarity threats include mandatory rotation of engagement 
partners and restrictions on certain employment relationships between auditors’ 
family members and auditees.
• Intimidation threat—a threat that arises from an auditor being inappropriately 
pressured by an auditee or by another interested party. Various pressures faced by 
auditors are described in Section II; many of those pressures are present in all audits 
and do not represent intimidation unless the pressures become too severe. 
Nevertheless, intimidation threats may arise, overtly or covertly, in a variety of 
situations where disagreements occur between an auditor and a member of an auditee’s 
management—for example, disagreements over the auditee’s application of an 
accounting principle. This threat also may arise if individuals higher up in an auditor’s 
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firm pressure the auditor to accede to the position of an auditee’s management in that 
or in similar situations. Safeguards that may mitigate or eliminate intimidation threats 
include concurring partner reviews, internal consultation requirements, and an 
appropriate “tone at the top” in both auditing firms and auditees.
128. Different types of threats may arise in one set of circumstances. For example, if an 
auditor’s relative is a member of auditee management and the auditor works on that auditee’s 
engagement, three types of threats may be present:
• Self-interest—the auditor’s personal relationship with his or her family member 
may create an emotional or financial self-interest in the outcome of the audit.
• Advocacy—the auditor may show partiality toward the work of the family 
member, which may impair the auditor’s ability to serve as an unbiased attestor of the 
auditee’s financial statements.
• Familiarity (or trust)—the auditor’s personal relationship with the family member 
may make it difficult for the auditor to maintain professional skepticism.
129. Although different methods of classifying threats could be developed, the 
classifications used above are based on the systems in use and under development by standard 
setters in various places outside the United States, including the United Kingdom (the 
Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales [ICAEW]), in Europe (the 
Federation des Experts Comptables Europeens [FEE]), and internationally (the International 
Federation of Accountants [IFAC]).  Some respondents to this DM may believe that 
modifications to these classifications are desirable or that a different system should be 
considered by the ISB in developing its conceptual framework. When commenting on this 
DM, those respondents are encouraged to describe those modifications or an alternative 
classification system and the advantages the modifications or alternative system provides.
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130. A basic principle of auditor independence concerns the need to classify threats that 
may arise in various circumstances. Such a principle could be expressed as follows:
68 These are called “threats to objectivity” by ICAEW and FEE. See ICAEW, Guidance for Members in 
Practice (London: ICAEW, 1996), Section 1.201, and FEE, Statutory Audit Independence and Objectivity 
(Brussels: FEE, July 1998), p. 9. IFAC describes four classifications of “risks” or threats to independence; it 
combines the familiarity and intimidation classifications into one category, labeled “client influence.” (See 
IFAC, Discussion Draft, “Independence,” proposed revision to Code of Ethics of Professional Accountants 
[New York: IFAC, August 1999], Part B, paras. 8.6-8.22.) Threats to auditor independence and objectivity also 
are discussed in the guidelines for social and ethical audits developed by the Institute of Social and Ethical 
AccountAbility (ISEA) (Exposure Draft, AccountAbility 1000 Framework [London: ISEA, November 1999], p. 
38).
Basic Principle 1—Different types of threats to auditor independence 
—including self-interest, self-review, advocacy, familiarity (or trust), and 
intimidation—arise in different circumstances.
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Significance of Threats
131. The significance of a threat depends on factors such as its force, the stature of the 
persons involved, the nature of the matter causing the threat, and the strength of the auditor’s 
integrity. All of those factors need to be evaluated in the context of the specific circumstances 
in which the threat arises. Some of the factors may be quantifiable; others may not be. For 
example, the extent to which an auditor’s financial interest in an auditee creates a threat to the 
auditor’s independence may depend, in part, on the value of the interest relative to the 
auditor’s net worth (which is quantifiable) and on the degree of “directness” of the interest 
(e.g., a direct investment in an auditee’s equity securities contrasted with an indirect 
investment through a mutual fund that invests in the equity securities of many entities), which 
is not quantifiable. A threat can be considered significant if, considering all of its quantitative 
and qualitative aspects, it increases the level of independence risk to an unacceptably high 
level.
132. A basic principle of auditor independence concerns the relative significance of threats 
to auditor independence. Such a principle could be expressed as follows:
Basic Principle 2—The significance of threats created in specific circumstances 
affects the level of independence risk.
Safeguards to Auditor Independence
133. The process of analyzing the independence of auditors includes identifying and 
assessing the effectiveness of safeguards that are in place that may mitigate or eliminate the 
threat or threats posed in specific circumstances. Two basic principles related to safeguard 
identification and analysis are discussed below.
Safeguard Identification
134. As described in Section V, safeguards work either singly or in combination to mitigate 
or eliminate one or more threats to auditor independence, thereby reducing the level of 
independence risk. Different safeguards may mitigate or eliminate different types and levels of 
significance of threats,  and one safeguard may mitigate or eliminate several threats. Some 
safeguards are quantifiable (e.g., a policy regarding the maximum percentage of total fees that 
an auditing firm can derive from one auditee); others are not (e.g., a prohibition against an 
auditor undertaking a specific activity or having a family member with a specific employment 
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69 Burke discusses various types of safeguards to auditor independence from an organizational psychology 
perspective. He considers factors that motivate auditors to maintain their independence, including specific 
safeguards that are internal to an individual auditor and those that are external. See W. Warner Burke, “Auditor 
Independence: An Organizational Psychology Perspective,” in AICPA, Serving the Public Interest: A New 
Conceptual Framework for Auditor Independence [White Paper] (New York: AICPA, 1997), Appendix C.
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relationship with an auditee). Some safeguards are preventive in nature (e.g., an orientation 
program for newly hired auditors that emphasizes the importance of independence); others are 
related to threats arising in specific circumstances (e.g., prohibitions against certain 
employment relationships between auditors’ family members and auditees); still others are 
designed to deter violations of other safeguards by increasing the likelihood that they will be 
discovered (e.g., reviews of auditors’ securities portfolios to detect prohibited investments).
135. Some safeguards reside in the environment in which audits are performed as part of the 
systems that help ensure overall audit quality—for example, the activities and requirements of 
the various bodies involved in public regulation and self-regulation of the auditing profession. 
Those safeguards include regulatory actions by state boards of accountancy, the SEC and 
other regulatory bodies, and the legal liability faced by auditors and other participants in the 
capital markets. Other elements in the present environment related to safeguarding auditor 
independence include the following:
• the importance of the reputations of auditing firms and individual auditors and the 
importance of independence in maintaining those reputations
• peer review programs that assess firm-wide compliance with professional 
standards and regulatory requirements regarding independence
• general oversight by auditees’ audit committees and boards of directors concerning 
compliance with the regulatory requirement that an auditee’s financial statements be 
audited by auditors who are independent
• other aspects of corporate governance, including an auditee’s “tone at the top,” 
that support auditor independence
136. This group of safeguards also includes the wide variety of rules that are designed 
specifically to help maintain auditor independence. For example, public regulatory bodies, 
such as the SEC and state boards of accountancy, and self-regulatory bodies, such as the ISB 
and AICPA, recognize that auditors face potential threats to their independence. In response, 
those bodies have developed rules, standards, and codes of professional conduct that contain 
various types of safeguards to auditor independence.
137. A second group of safeguards exists within auditing firms. Some are mandated by 
regulators, and others are adopted voluntarily by the firms. These safeguards are part of an 
auditing firm’s quality control policies and procedures  and include policies and procedures 
related to auditee acceptance and retention, the rotation of engagement management, concurring 
partner reviews, requirements for internal consultation on technical issues, and maintaining a 
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70 Auditing firms are required by AICPA quality control standards to develop and implement effective internal 
policies and procedures that provide “reasonable assurance” that firm personnel are independent. Those 
responsibilities are described in AICPA Statement on Quality Control Standards No. 2 (QC Section 20.09).
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“tone at the top” in the auditing firm that stresses the importance of auditor independence.71 
Other safeguards in auditing firms include policies and procedures related specifically to 
independence, such as a policy prohibiting investments in any auditee by any auditor or other 
professional employee of the auditing firm, and personnel hiring, training, promotion, and 
retention policies that emphasize the importance of auditor independence, the potential 
threats raised in various circumstances that auditors in the firm may face, and specific 
safeguards in place to mitigate or eliminate those threats.
71 Researchers have suggested that an ethical “tone at the top” can be established in various ways. For example, 
when members of senior management in an auditing firm serve as role models by behaving ethically, they send 
clearer signals to subordinates that the firm expects that kind of behavior from all who work in the firm. Another 
method that helps establish an ethical “tone at the top” is for the auditing firm to adopt a code of ethics and 
related policies and procedures that help ensure that the code is communicated and enforced. See Don W. Finn, 
Lawrence B. Chonko, and Shelby D. Hunt, “Ethical Problems in Public Accounting: The View from the Top,” 
Journal of Business Ethics (Vol. 7, 1988), pp. 605-15.
138. Some have suggested that additional safeguards entailing structural changes in the 
environment should be developed. Those suggestions include having auditors employed by a 
governmental agency rather than by auditing firms; requiring government appointment of 
auditors; requiring mandatory rotation of auditing firms; having auditors retained for multi­
year, instead of annual, periods; permitting auditees to change auditing firms only for cause; 
and prohibiting auditing firms from performing all management advisory services for auditees.
139. One way to classify safeguards related specifically to auditor independence is based on 
the extent to which activities and relationships are restricted. Under this method, one type of 
safeguard provides for absolute prohibition of an activity or relationship—for example, 
prohibiting auditors from having any direct financial investment in any auditees. Another 
type of safeguard permits the activity or relationship, but restricts its extent or form—for 
example, a restriction that auditors cannot have material indirect financial interests in auditees. 
A third type of safeguard permits the activity or relationship, but requires other policies and 
procedures to address the threat—for example, the mandatory rotation of an engagement 
partner after he or she has spent a certain period of time on a specific audit engagement. A 
fourth type of safeguard permits an activity or relationship but requires the auditor to disclose 
information about it to the auditee’s management, audit committee, board, or others—for 
example, disclosure to an auditee’s audit committee of non-audit services provided by the 
auditor to the auditee.
140. A basic principle of auditor independence concerns the need to identify different types 
of safeguards. Such a principle could be expressed as follows:
Basic Principle 3—Different types of safeguards—including prohibitions, 
restrictions, other policies and procedures, and disclosures—can mitigate or 
eliminate threats to auditor independence.
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Effectiveness of Safeguards
141. When analyzing safeguards, it is not sufficient to consider the types of safeguards that 
are, or could be put, in place. Independence risk will not be reduced unless safeguards operate 
effectively to mitigate or eliminate threats created in specific circumstances. The extent to 
which they do so depends on their design, how they are applied, the consistency with which 
they are applied, by whom they are applied, and to whom they are applied. A safeguard is 
considered effective by itself or in combination with other safeguards if it reduces the level of 
independence risk to an acceptably low level.
142. A basic principle of auditor independence concerns the relative effectiveness of 
alternative safeguards. Such a principle could be expressed as follows:
Basic Principle 4—The effectiveness of the design and operation of various 
safeguards affects the level of independence risk.
Independence Risk and Auditor Independence
143. As discussed in Section V, the level of independence risk can be thought of as a 
continuum. At one end of that continuum, there is “no risk of impaired independence.” At 
the other end, there is “certainty of impaired independence.” Because they increase the level 
of independence risk, threats to auditor independence move an auditor toward the “certainty 
of impaired independence” end of the continuum. Safeguards to auditor independence may 
mitigate or eliminate threats, thereby reducing the level of independence risk—that is, they 
may move an auditor toward the “no risk of impaired independence” end of the continuum. 
Identifying and analyzing the types and significance of threats and the types and effectiveness 
of safeguards, as described in Basic Principles 1-4, allow standard setters to assess the level of 
independence risk in specific circumstances.
144. A basic principle of auditor independence concerns the process of assessing 
independence risk. Such a principle could be expressed as follows:
Basic Principle 5—The ISB should assess the level of independence risk by 
considering the significance of the threats to auditor independence created by 
specific circumstances and the effectiveness of the safeguards that mitigate or 
eliminate those threats when it develops standards for auditor independence.
145. Section V notes that the level of independence risk—that is, its position on the 
independence risk continuum—is not easily quantifiable (although respondents who believe 
that quantification is desirable are encouraged to include in their comments a description of a 
quantitative approach to independence risk assessments). Nevertheless, it can be argued that 
segments of the independence risk continuum can be described in terms of the likelihood that 
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independence is impaired. For example, three segments and two endpoints of the continuum 
could be described as follows72:
72 This description of the segments on the independence risk continuum is adapted from the classifications used 
in FASB Statement No. 5, Accounting for Contingencies (Stamford, CT: FASB, 1975), para. 3.
• No risk of impaired independence—auditor is clearly independent
• Remote risk of impaired independence—impaired independence is very unlikely
• Some risk of impaired independence—independence might be impaired
• Probable risk of impaired independence—impaired independence is very likely
• Certainty of impaired independence—auditor is clearly not independent
146. After analyzing both the threats to auditor independence created in specific 
circumstances and the safeguards that mitigate or eliminate those threats, the level of 
independence risk can be described as being in one of the segments, or at one of the endpoints, 
on the independence risk continuum. The ISB then can determine whether that level is in a 
segment or at the endpoint on the independence risk continuum that it considers to be 
“acceptably low.” If it is not, the ISB can decide which additional safeguard, or combination 
of safeguards, will reduce independence risk to an acceptably low level.
147. A basic principle of auditor independence that addresses the need to ensure that 
independence risk is “acceptably low” could be expressed as follows:
Basic Principle 6—The ISB should determine whether, in the specific 
circumstances under consideration, the level of independence risk is acceptably 
low.
148. It can be argued that the only acceptably low level is at the “no risk of impaired 
independence” endpoint of the independence risk continuum. Under this view, the goal of 
ensuring financial statement reliability is too important for the ISB to allow any independence 
risk—that is, any threats to auditor independence that are not fully eliminated by safeguards. 
Some may believe that such a goal is appropriate in the face of the difficulties described above 
in assessing both the level of independence risk and the effectiveness of various safeguards in 
dealing with potential threats to auditor independence. Under this view, this is the only way 
that the ISB can define an objective, ascertainable “bright line” for establishing an acceptably 
low level of independence risk.
149. In order for independence risk to be at the “no risk of impaired independence” 
endpoint of the continuum, effective safeguards would need to be in place to ensure that 
independence risk resulting from any threats to auditor independence that arise in specific 
circumstances is completely eliminated. It can be argued that a position at the “no risk of 
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impaired independence” endpoint of the independence risk continuum is unrealistic, 
unattainable, or too costly to achieve. Establishing that endpoint as a goal would, in effect, 
mandate that the ISB prescribe safeguards that could provide “absolute assurance” of auditor 
independence, a level of assurance that audits themselves are not designed to provide. It also 
can be argued that safeguards rarely can be completely effective in eliminating all threats, or 
that such a level of effectiveness can be achieved only at an excessive cost. Those who hold 
this view may believe that individual auditors have different personal attributes and different 
degrees of those attributes.73 Those who hold this view also may believe that the “no risk of 
impaired independence” end of the independence risk continuum is best considered an 
aspirational ideal, rather than something that can be achieved.
73 Research has been conducted that considers what factors may influence individual auditors’ judgments 
regarding their independence. For example, Sweeney and Roberts found that auditors at lower levels of moral 
development were also more likely to rely solely on independence rules, rather than their own ethical beliefs, 
when making judgments about independence. They also suggested that the “tone at the top” in an auditing firm 
works together with an individual auditor’s level of moral development in determining an auditor’s reaction to 
independence issues (John T. Sweeney and Robin W. Roberts, “Cognitive Moral Development and Auditor 
Independence,” Accounting, Organizations, and Society [Vol. 22, 1997], pp. 337-52).
74 Such judgments also would need to be made by other individuals or organizations when they assess 
independence risk—for example, auditing firms adopting independence policies, individual auditors making 
decisions when faced with situations for which there is neither authoritative guidance nor firm policy, auditees 
and audit committees meeting their responsibilities to retain auditors who are independent, and regulators 
meeting their statutory responsibilities.
150. Those who hold this view also believe that the ISB will need to judge when the threats 
to auditor independence that arise in specific circumstances are sufficiently mitigated by 
existing or new safeguards so that independence risk is acceptably low—that is, in an area of 
the continuum that is sufficiently close to the “no risk of impaired independence” endpoint.  
Under this view, accepting some level of independence risk is a practical necessity, but that 
level should be sufficiently low to ensure that there is only a very small risk of impaired 
independence.
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151. Given the extent of judgment involved in determining independence risk in specific 
circumstances and the importance of independence in ensuring audit quality and reliable 
financial statements, the ISB could use as a guideline that only a very low level of 
independence risk is acceptable—for example, one that falls in the “remote risk of impaired 
independence” segment of the continuum. Under this view, such a low level might balance the 
practical difficulties of eliminating all independence risk against the need to ensure that audits 
provide increased financial statement reliability and that stakeholders have confidence in the 
independence of auditors and in the reliability of audited financial statements.
Which Individuals Are Affected by Threats and Safeguards?
152. It can be argued that the ISB’s assessments of independence risk should include 
consideration of which individuals in an auditing firm are subject to threats created in specific 
circumstances and what safeguards concerning those individuals are, or could be put, in place. 
Under this view, some threats concern only specific individuals within an auditing firm—for 
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example, an employment relationship between a family member of a junior staff member on an 
engagement team and an auditee may create a threat only for the junior staff member. Under 
this view, safeguards that mitigate or eliminate a threat concern only those specific individuals 
directly involved—in this case, only the junior staff member.
153. It can be argued, however, that a sense of collegiality often develops among individuals 
in auditing firms, whether or not they work together on an audit engagement, and therefore 
that a person’s judgment also might be influenced by relationships involving colleagues’ 
families. Consequently, those relationships also may pose a threat to auditor independence. 
To mitigate or eliminate such threats, safeguards could apply to others in addition to the 
specific individual or individuals directly involved in the audit. In the previous example, 
instead of prohibiting only family relationships between the engagement team and the auditee, 
the prohibition could be extended to include all individuals in an auditing firm who supervise 
or otherwise are in a position to influence the design, performance, or outcome of the audit; to 
all individuals in the firm who provide any type of service to the auditee; to all individuals 
with a certain level of responsibility in the firm (e.g., partners); or to all individuals in the firm 
without exception.
154. It also can be argued that different safeguards should be applied to different groups of 
individuals within an auditing firm, depending on the significance of the threats posed. For 
example, the most stringent safeguards (such as prohibitions) could be applied to those most 
closely involved with the engagement, such as the members of the engagement team (and 
perhaps including those in the auditing firm in a position to influence the audit). Less 
stringent safeguards (such as required disclosure to the auditee’s audit committee) might be 
adequate for others within the auditing firm for whom the threat is less significant because 
they are less likely to be able to influence the audit. Those who hold this view also may 
believe that some threats to auditor independence relate to the independence of the auditing 
firm as a whole—for example, loans by an auditee to an auditing firm or financial investments 
in an auditee by an auditing firm’s defined benefit pension plan. For these threats, it can be 
argued that safeguards should apply to all professionals (or to some subset, such as all 
partners) in an auditing firm and to the firm itself.
155. The need to consider the individuals affected by threats and safeguards could be 
expressed in a basic principle as follows:
Basic Principle 7—The ISB should consider which individuals in an auditing 
firm (as well as the firm itself) are affected by one or more threats to auditor 
independence in the specific circumstances under consideration and whether 
one or more safeguards effectively mitigate or eliminate those threats.
156. It can be argued, however, that the ISB should not be concerned with which individuals 
in an auditing firm are affected by threats to auditor independence. Under this view, it is 
difficult, if not impossible, to identify which specific individuals or groups of individuals in an 
auditing firm face threats to auditor independence in specific circumstances. For example, in 
circumstances in which an auditor’s relative is a member of auditee management, the ISB may 
be unable to determine whether the threat posed by the employment relationship is limited to 
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the individual engagement team member whose relative is employed by the auditee; the threat 
to auditor independence may extend to all auditors located in any of the auditing firm’s offices 
where firm personnel work on the engagement, or possibly to all auditors in the entire firm. 
Under this view, it is difficult to design effective safeguards that apply to specific individuals 
or groups within a firm that mitigate or eliminate threats to auditor independence because of 
the difficulty in identifying which individuals in a firm face threats in specific circumstances 
and the relative significance of the threats faced by those individuals. Those who hold this 
view may believe that Basic Principle 7 offers no substantive guidance to the ISB. Instead, the 
ISB should develop broadly applicable safeguards, including prohibitions, when it identifies 
threats to auditor independence.
Benefit and Cost Considerations in Independence Standard Setting
157. As described in Section V, safeguards to auditor independence may have many types 
of benefits and costs. It can be argued that the ISB should consider the costs of existing and 
proposed safeguards and the benefits resulting from reduced independence risk. That would 
require the ISB to assess not only the level of independence risk when it considers threats 
posed in specific circumstances but also the costs of possible safeguards.
158. A basic principle concerning the need to consider costs and benefits could be expressed 
as follows:
Basic Principle 8—The ISB should weigh the costs of alternative safeguards 
against the benefits of reduced independence risk resulting from those 
safeguards when it develops standards for auditor independence.
159. Section V describes some of the difficulties in identifying and measuring the benefits 
and costs of safeguards. For this and other reasons, it can be argued that the ISB should ignore 
costs and benefits in setting independence standards. Faced with a similar choice, the FASB 
chose to do otherwise.
Despite the difficulties, the Board does not conclude that it should turn its back on the 
matter, for there are some things it can do to safeguard the cost-effectiveness of its 
standards. Before a decision is made to develop a standard, the Board needs to satisfy 
itself that the matter to be ruled on represents a significant problem and that a standard 
that is promulgated will not impose costs on the many for the benefit of a few. If the 
proposal passes that first test, a second test may subsequently be useful. There are 
usually alternative ways of handling an issue. Is one of them less costly and only 
slightly less effective? Even if absolute magnitudes cannot be attached to costs and 
benefits, a comparison between alternatives may yet be possible and useful.75
75 Financial Accounting Standards Board, Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 2, Qualitative 
Characteristics of Accounting Information (Stamford, CT: FASB, 1980), para. 143.
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160. The ISB often will be faced not only with a choice among different safeguards that vary 
in terms of their cost and effectiveness but also with alternative ways of applying a particular 
safeguard. In weighing the costs and benefits of alternative safeguards, the ISB need not 
consider the dollar amount of costs and benefits of a particular safeguard, but rather only the 
differential costs and benefits of that safeguard as compared with others. The latter may be 
more susceptible to measurement than the former.
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SECTION VII —BASIC PRINCIPLES OF AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE: 
CONSIDERING STAKEHOLDERS’ PERCEPTIONS
161. As part of its process of establishing independence standards, the ISB is committed to 
seeking the views of the various stakeholders in auditor independence.  Different stakeholder 
groups and different individuals within a particular stakeholder group may have different 
perceptions about auditors and about matters related to auditor independence. In addition, 
there are different ways in which the ISB could include those perceptions in its standard­
setting process. This section discusses factors that may affect perceptions of auditor 
independence and describes how a basic principle of auditor independence might address the 
role of perceptions in the ISB’s standard-setting process.
76
162. The basic questions raised by this section are:
76 “The operating policies of the ISB ... are designed to permit timely, thorough, and open study of issues 
involving auditor independence and to encourage broad public participation in the process of establishing and 
improving independence standards. The objective of the ISB’s policy of openness and public participation is to 
stimulate public consideration and debate on matters relating to its objective and mission. All of the ISB’s 
constituencies, including members of the public, are encouraged to express their views on matters under 
consideration in order to stimulate constructive public dialogue” (ISB, “Independence Standards Board 
Operating Policies,” <www.cpaindependence.org>, Preamble).
Question VII-1: Are there aspects of stakeholders’ perceptions other than those 
discussed in this DM that are relevant to, and should be considered in, a 
conceptual framework for auditor independence? If so, please describe them 
and their relevance to auditor independence.
Question VII-2: Which of the alternatives described in this section, if any, 
should form the basis for a basic principle related to consideration of 
stakeholders’ perceptions to be included in a conceptual framework? Please 
explain your views.
Question VII-3: Are there ways other than those noted in the alternative basic 
principles described in this section by which the ISB could consider 
stakeholders’ perceptions in its standard-setting process? If so, please describe 
them.
Bases of Stakeholders’ Perceptions
163. The professional auditing literature has long recognized the importance of the public’s 
views concerning the independence of auditors. For example, Statement on Auditing 
Standards No. 1 notes:
It is of utmost importance to the profession that the general public maintain confidence 
in the independence of independent auditors. Public confidence would be impaired by 
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evidence that independence was actually lacking, and it might also be impaired by the 
existence of circumstances which reasonable people might believe likely to influence 
independence. To be independent, the auditor must be intellectually honest; to be 
recognized as independent, he must be free from any obligation to or interest in the 
client, its management, or its owners. ... Independent auditors should not only be 
independent in fact; they should avoid situations that may lead outsiders to doubt their 
independence.77
77 Statement on Auditing Standards No. 1, Codification of Auditing Standards and Procedures (AU Section 
220.03, emphasis in original).
78 AICPA Code of Professional Conduct, ET Section 55.03.
164. The AICPA Code of Professional Conduct’s discussion about an auditor’s 
professional responsibilities for maintaining independence includes a similar notion concerning 
the “appearance” of independence:
For a member in public practice, the maintenance of objectivity and independence 
requires a continuing assessment of client relationships and public responsibility. Such 
a member who provides auditing and other attestation services should be independent 
in fact and appearance.78
165. Many academic research studies have examined the perceptions of different groups of 
stakeholders about matters related to auditor independence. Among the groups studied are 
stockholders, creditors, financial analysts, auditors, auditee managements and board members, 
and regulators. Those studies have looked at a wide variety of interests and relationships 
between auditors and auditees that researchers felt might create the perception of a threat to 
auditor independence. Researchers also have examined those groups’ beliefs about aspects of 
the environment in which audits take place, including various characteristics of auditing firms 
and auditees. The following are examples of the types of factors that have been studied:
• the characteristics of auditing firms—such as their size and reputation
• the characteristics of auditees—such as their financial condition and industry
• the characteristics of the relationship between auditing firms and auditees—such as 
the number of years the auditor works on a specific audit engagement and the types 
and extent of various auditor-auditee relationships
• environmental factors—such as the risk of legal liability and the level of 
competition in the audit market
• the types and extent of non-audit services provided to auditees
• the effectiveness of various safeguards to auditor independence—such as 
concurring partner reviews
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166. The results of this research suggest that stakeholders’ knowledge about the 
organizations, processes, and rules related to auditor independence is very limited.  It also 
suggests that, because of differences within and between stakeholder groups, the ISB may 
have to decide whose perceptions should be considered and the weight those perceptions 
should be given in the standard-setting process.
79
167. Stakeholders’ perceptions of auditor independence may be similar to perceptions in 
other situations in which public opinion is based on beliefs about the effectiveness of 
regulatory systems that help ensure the quality of goods and services, rather than on detailed 
knowledge about the quality of the goods or services themselves. For example, airline 
passengers do not ordinarily know, or have access to, the maintenance and inspection records 
of an airplane before they board it. Instead, they may believe that relatively few safety 
incidents occur and that it is safe to fly. This may reinforce passengers’ beliefs that the 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the regulatory agency that has responsibility for 
ensuring airplane safety in the United States, has appropriately discharged its responsibility 
by ensuring that regulations for airplane safety have been properly designed and are operating 
effectively. Passengers also may believe that airplane manufacturers and airline companies 
have satisfied their responsibilities for meeting safety regulations as well as their own 
manufacturing and operating standards for the airplanes that they build and operate. When 
safety problems with planes occur, public confidence in the industry and in the regulatory 
system overseeing it is enhanced if people believe that follow-up investigations are handled 
appropriately and that any changes in the regulations or processes necessary to ensure 
passenger safety are successfully implemented. Members of the public also may believe that, 
when necessary, recourse to the legal system is available to ensure that consumers will be 
compensated for losses caused by responsible parties and that, when appropriate, criminal 
sanctions will be imposed. This also may be thought to have a deterrent effect.
168. In a similar manner, it can be argued that most stakeholders in auditor independence 
cannot identify the individual auditors assigned to a particular engagement or the attributes 
79 In November 1999, the ISB published the results of a comprehensive series of interviews with various 
stakeholders concerning their perceptions of issues related to auditor independence. The study indicated that 
there were differences between and within various stakeholder groups (Earnscliffe Research & Communications, 
“Report to the United States Independence Standards Board: Research into Perceptions of Auditor Independence 
and Objectivity,” <www.cpaindependence.org>. Engle and Sincich studied the perceptions of a random sample 
of auditors concerning a wide range of independence issues and also found differences in their beliefs (Terry J. 
Engle and Terry L. Sincich, “The Loss of Auditor Independence: Perceptions of Staff Auditors, Audit Seniors, 
and Audit Managers,” Research on Accounting Ethics [Vol. 4, 1998], pp. 167-84).
For a summary of many of the research findings on stakeholders’ perceptions, see Gary Kleinman, Dan 
Palmon, and Asokan Anandarajan, “Auditor Independence: A Synthesis of Theory and Empirical Research,” 
Research in Accounting Regulation (Vol. 12, 1998), pp. 3-42, and F.Todd DeZoort and Alan T. Lord, “A 
Review and Synthesis of Pressure Effects Research in Accounting,” Journal of Accounting Literature (Vol. 16, 
1997), pp. 28-85. The authors note that the findings tend to be inconclusive or contradictory, in part because 
different types of stakeholders and different individuals perceive the factors that create threats to auditor 
independence quite differently. The authors also suggest that a variety of methodological problems, such as 
modeling pressures on auditors in experimental research environments and biases that may exist in survey 
research, make it difficult to interpret the findings.
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that those auditors may have and exercise during an audit. Nor are they aware of threats to 
auditor independence that may increase independence risk on a specific audit engagement, the 
safeguards that may mitigate or eliminate the threats on that engagement, or details of the rules 
that help ensure auditor independence on all audit engagements. As a result, stakeholders’ 
perceptions about auditor independence may be based on their beliefs that the organizations, 
processes, and rules that help ensure auditor independence generally are functioning 
effectively.80 Those beliefs, in turn, may be influenced by the relatively few instances of 
independence problems that are reported in the financial press or otherwise brought to the 
public’s attention. When an independence problem does surface, stakeholders may believe 
that the problem was caused by the actions of an individual, a firm, or an auditee and generally 
can be resolved satisfactorily through the regulatory or legal system. If systemic problems are 
found with the organizations, processes, or rules that help ensure auditor independence, 
stakeholders also may believe that they will be addressed appropriately by standard setters or 
regulators.
80 Mautz and Sharaf used the term “profession-independence” to describe
the image of auditors as a group brought to mind when the term “auditor” or CPA is used.... To 
many people who have never had direct acquaintance with independent auditors, the term still has 
meaning, a meaning which they have gained from what they have read, from the impression various 
forms of mass communication media have made upon them, and from the ideas passed on to them 
by various opinion leaders. There are many people who, although they know an individual auditor 
and think highly of him, may well have quite another impression of the profession. When the time 
comes for them to rely on the work of unknown auditors, it is their general impression that will 
govern (The Philosophy of Auditing, p. 205).
Incorporating Stakeholders’ Perceptions
169. Section III of this DM suggests that the goals of auditor independence could include
improving financial statement reliability and enhancing financial statement credibility and 
stakeholder confidence in financial statement reliability. The ISB’s views about those goals 
may affect how and to what extent stakeholders’ perceptions are incorporated in the 
independence standard-setting process. The remainder of this section describes three views of 
the role that stakeholders’ perceptions could play in the ISB’s standard-setting process. Each 
of those views could lead to a basic principle of auditor independence that addresses how the 
ISB should consider stakeholders’ perceptions in setting independence standards. Such a 
principle could be expressed as one of the following:
Basic Principle 9A—The ISB should solicit the views of all stakeholders and 
develop independence standards that reflect stakeholders’ perceptions.
Basic Principle 9B—The ISB should solicit the views of all stakeholders but 
develop independence standards that reflect the likely perceptions of a 
hypothetical group of stakeholders, namely, “reasonable, fully informed users 
of financial statements.”
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Basic Principle 9C—The ISB should solicit the views of all stakeholders and be 
informed by stakeholders’ perceptions, but develop independence standards 
based on the ISB’s judgment about how best to meet the goal or goals of auditor 
independence.
Reflecting the Perceptions of Stakeholders
170. Reflecting the perceptions of stakeholders in auditor independence—the approach 
described in Basic Principle 9A—is compatible with the belief that both improved financial 
statement reliability and enhanced financial statement credibility and stakeholder confidence in 
that reliability are appropriate goals of auditor independence. It is incompatible with the 
belief that the only appropriate goal of auditor independence is improved financial statement 
reliability. This alternative reflects the belief that a standard-setting process based on the 
views of all, or at least a broad cross-section of, stakeholders is more likely to ensure 
stakeholder confidence in the ISB, in its standard-setting process, and in the independence of 
auditors.
171. To promulgate standards that reflect the perceptions of all, or at least a broad cross­
section of, stakeholders, the ISB first would have to identify those perceptions. Information 
about stakeholders’ perceptions could be gathered from many sources—including surveys, 
focus groups, and other types of research; input from stakeholders who serve on ISB task 
forces and other working groups; stakeholders’ responses to issues raised in ISB discussion 
memoranda and exposure drafts; and stakeholders’ testimony at public hearings.
172. Because of the complexity of the issues and differences in knowledge and beliefs about 
auditors and their independence, however, there are likely to be significant differences in 
perceptions between and within stakeholder groups. The ISB would need to decide how to 
incorporate those differing perceptions into its standard-setting process, in effect deciding 
whether the perceptions of some stakeholders or stakeholder groups should be weighed more 
heavily than the perceptions of other individuals or groups.
Reflecting the Perceptions of Reasonable, Fully Informed Users
173. An alternative view—expressed in Basic Principle 9B—is that the ISB should develop 
independence standards that reflect the perceptions that a hypothetical group of stakeholders, 
namely, “reasonable, fully informed users of financial statements,” would be likely to have. 
Like the previous alternative, this view is compatible with the belief that both improved 
financial statement reliability and enhanced financial statement credibility and stakeholder 
confidence in that reliability are appropriate goals of auditor independence, and incompatible 
with the belief that the only appropriate goal of auditor independence is improved financial 
statement reliability.
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174. The “reasonable, fully informed user” concept has its roots in the “reasonable person” 
and “reasonable investor” concepts that are currently in the auditor independence literature. 
For example, the AICPA Code of Professional Conduct notes:
Members must be aware that it is impossible to enumerate all circumstances wherein 
the appearance of a member’s independence might be questioned by third parties.... 
[M]embers must consider whether [a relationship or interest] ... would lead a 
reasonable person aware of all the facts, who took into consideration normal strength 
of character and normal behavior under such circumstances, to conclude that the 
situation poses an unacceptable threat to the member’s objectivity and appearance of 
independence.81
81 AICPA Code of Professional Conduct, Interpretation 101-9 (ET Section 101.11).
82 SEC Financial Reporting Release No. 50, The Establishment and Improvement of Standards Related to 
Auditor Independence (February 18, 1998), Section I (footnote omitted).
175. The SEC describes that group of stakeholders in a similar way:
Pursuant to the Commission’s regulations, the basic test for auditor independence is 
whether a reasonable investor, knowing all relevant facts and circumstances, would 
perceive an auditor as having neither mutual nor conflicting interests with its audit 
client and as exercising objective and impartial judgment on all issues brought to the 
auditor’s attention.82
176. The ISB can gain insights into what the perceptions of “reasonable, fully informed 
users” would likely be from the various sources of stakeholders’ perceptions discussed 
previously. If it uses this approach, the ISB will have to infer, from the input it receives, the 
relevant views of a hypothetical group of reasonable, fully informed stakeholders concerning 
the effectiveness of alternative safeguards in mitigating or eliminating threats to auditor 
independence. Because it may be difficult to draw such inferences, however, some believe that 
the ISB should not adopt an approach to standard setting requiring that its decisions reflect 
the perceptions of even a limited class of stakeholders. Rather, the ISB should use its own 
judgment to evaluate what new standards, if any, best meet the goal or goals of auditor 
independence. That alternative view is described below.
Using Judgment Informed by Stakeholders’ Perceptions
177. As expressed in Basic Principle 9C, an alternative to the two views described 
previously is that the ISB should be informed by stakeholders’ perceptions, but should not 
base its decisions on those perceptions. Under this view, the ISB, rather than a group or 
groups of stakeholders, is in the best position to judge the long-term impact of proposed 
standards on the goal or goals of auditor independence, and its standard-setting process should 
not prevent it from making those judgments, even if those judgments differ from those of 
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stakeholders. Like the alternatives discussed in the previous two subsections, this alternative 
is compatible with the belief that both improved financial statement reliability and enhanced 
financial statement credibility and stakeholder confidence in that reliability are appropriate 
goals of auditor independence.
178. The difference between this alternative and those discussed previously can be 
illustrated by considering how the ISB might choose among alternative courses of action when 
dealing with a specific issue. Using either of the two previous alternative approaches, the ISB 
would necessarily reflect in its standards the perceptions of one or more stakeholder groups, 
regardless of the views of the ISB members themselves. Under this alternative, the ISB would 
not be bound by the views of any stakeholder group or groups—for example, the ISB might 
issue a standard that mandates safeguards the ISB believes are necessary to help ensure 
financial statement reliability, even if one or more stakeholder groups believe otherwise. The 
ISB might believe, in this situation, that the benefits of the additional safeguards—expressed 
as improved financial statement reliability or decreased independence risk—exceed their costs. 
The ISB might conclude, in another situation, that additional safeguards are unnecessary 
because it believes independence risk is sufficiently low without them, even if one or more 
groups of stakeholders—for example, reasonable, fully informed users—believe that a 
significant threat to auditor independence exists in those circumstances. In this situation, the 
ISB might take the position that the costs of additional safeguards exceed the limited benefits 
of enhanced financial statement credibility or stakeholder confidence that might result from 
those additional safeguards. Although stakeholders’ perceptions would not serve as the basis 
for the ISB’s conclusions, insights into those perceptions not only would inform its 
consideration of the issues, but also might affect the way that it communicates its conclusions 
and their rationale to stakeholders and, as a result, serve to improve stakeholders’ 
understanding of independence risk.
179. Some who believe that the alternative discussed in this subsection, or a variation 
thereof, is the appropriate alternative for the ISB to embrace, point to the processes used to 
establish rules by other bodies of experts, such as the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
and the FAA. Those bodies base their judgments about the need for new rules on all available 
information—including the results of actual and simulated testing of safety and efficacy as 
well as the public’s views about proposed rules—not simply on whether the public believes 
that the new rules are needed. Members of the general public, in turn, rely on the system 
(which includes the regulatory bodies responsible for setting and monitoring compliance with 
those rules) when they buy food and medicine or board an airplane. The public relies on the 
system because it believes that others with more expertise are in the best position to judge 
what rules are necessary and to enforce those rules. The regulatory bodies have open lines of 
communication with the public and typically receive extensive media coverage, thus affording 
them opportunities to explain their proposed policies and the underlying rationale.
180. Those who hold this view may believe that the ISB’s standard-setting process should 
work in the same way. That is, the ISB is in the best position to establish appropriate 
standards, based on a thorough evaluation of all available information, including input from 
stakeholders. Under this view, the ISB would neither ignore stakeholders’ perceptions nor 
base its decisions only on those perceptions. Instead, the ISB would solicit the views of 
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stakeholders and be informed by their perceptions by, for example, considering the potential 
impact of its conclusions on financial statement credibility and stakeholders’ confidence, as 
well as the potential impact on the reliability of financial statements.
181. This alternative is permissive with respect to the extent to which the ISB might 
incorporate stakeholders’ perceptions in its standard-setting process. Under a variation of 
this alternative, the ISB would adopt an independence standard only if it believed that the 
standard would improve financial statement reliability (subject to possible cost/benefit 
considerations). Under this view, the ISB would solicit the views of stakeholders and be 
informed by their perceptions, but it would not base its decisions on the potential impact of 
the standard on financial statement credibility or stakeholder confidence in financial statement 
reliability. This variation reflects the view that enhancing credibility and stakeholder 
confidence should not be part of the goals of auditor independence—improving financial 
statement reliability is the only appropriate goal of auditor independence. Basic Principle 9C 
would still apply, but the ISB’s focus would be on the goal of improved financial statement 
reliability. Under this view, if ISB standards improve financial statement reliability (and an 
effective system exists that ensures compliance with those standards), audit failures related to 
impaired independence should be rare, and stakeholders’ long-term views about the 
independence of auditors should reflect that reality. Effective communication and reliable 
financial statements would be the means by which independence standards would enhance 
financial statement credibility and stakeholder confidence in financial statement reliability. 
Independence standards themselves would not be based on whether they enhanced financial 
statement credibility or stakeholder confidence.
* * * *
182. Regardless of the ISB’s views about stakeholders’ perceptions, effective two-way 
communication between the ISB and stakeholders can help shape their opinions about the ISB, 
the process by which independence standards are promulgated, and the standards themselves, 
and ultimately enhance stakeholders’ confidence in the independence of auditors generally. 
The ISB can provide a variety of opportunities for stakeholders to furnish timely input—for 
example, stakeholder representation on task forces and working groups, presentations and 
panel discussions with stakeholder groups on issues of mutual concern, and broad distribution 
of discussion memoranda and exposure drafts to encourage stakeholders to share their views 
with the ISB. At various stages in the standard-setting process, the ISB can communicate its 
views on the nature of the threats that it believes are posed in the circumstances under 
consideration and the reasons why the ISB believes that additional safeguards are or are not 
the best solution in those circumstances. The Board also can explain the bases for its 
conclusions, both in the ISB standards and through other media. Efforts by the ISB to ensure 
effective communications with stakeholders may serve to increase stakeholders’ confidence in 
the organizations and processes involved in maintaining auditor independence as well as in 
financial statement reliability and the independence of auditors generally.
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APPENDIX A
Glossary
This appendix contains definitions of certain terms or phrases used in this Discussion 
Memorandum.
Auditee
The entity whose financial statements are being audited.
Competence
When applied to an auditor, the ability to develop an appropriate audit plan, to select 
suitable auditing procedures to test management’s assertions, to draw proper 
conclusions regarding the conformity of the financial statements with GAAP, and to 
render the appropriate auditor’s report.
Credibility
The quality of information that makes it believable.
Diligence
When applied to an auditor, approaching an audit with professional skepticism, 
efficient and careful handling of technical matters, and a willingness to devote adequate 
time and appropriate effort in performing an audit.
Information risk
The risk that users will make incorrect investment and credit decisions because the 
financial statements used in making those decisions contain material misstatements.
Integrity
When applied to an auditor, honesty, trustworthiness, candor, and truthfulness in 
performing an audit and making judgments regarding the financial statements’ 
conformity with GAAP.
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Objectivity
When applied to an auditor, impartiality—the ability to suppress any existing biases 
when obtaining and evaluating audit evidence and making audit judgments.
Partner
A person in an auditing firm (regardless of the legal form of organization) who is 
ultimately responsible for ensuring that the audit is planned, conducted, and reported 
on in accordance with the firm’s policies and generally accepted auditing standards, as 
well as those in the firm’s chain of command to whom that person reports.
Public entity
An entity that is required to file financial statements with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission.
Quality audit
An audit performed in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards.
Reliability
“The quality of information that assures that information is reasonably free from error 
and bias and faithfully represents what it purports to represent.”83 (Financial 
statements typically purport to represent that an entity’s financial position, results of 
operations, and cash flows are presented fairly, in all material respects, in conformity 
with generally accepted accounting principles.)
83 FASB, Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 2, Qualitative Characteristics of Accounting 
Information (Stamford, CT: FASB, 1980), “Glossaiy of Terms.”
Safeguards to auditor independence
Controls—including prohibitions, restrictions, other policies and procedures, and 
disclosures—that exist or could be put in place by standard setters, regulators, or 
auditing firms that mitigate or eliminate threats to auditor independence.
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Stakeholders in auditor independence
Auditees, auditors and auditing firms, regulators, users of audited financial statements, 
and others who may be affected by or who have an interest in the independence of 
auditors.
Threats to auditor independence
Factors—including pressures, activities, and relationships—that could impair auditor 
independence.
Users
Investors, creditors, and others who use audited financial statements in making 
investment and credit decisions.
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APPENDIX B
Examples of Goals of Auditor Independence
This appendix contains examples of goals of auditor independence found in a variety of 
authoritative and nonauthoritative sources in addition to those discussed in Section III. The 
examples are divided into two groups that roughly parallel the goals discussed in that section. 
Within each group, the examples are in chronological order. In some cases, however, precise 
chronological order was difficult to determine because it is unclear when some examples first 
appeared in the literature.
Goals Related to Financial Statement Reliability
Examples in the first group, like Goals 1 and 2 (and related modifications) in Section III, focus 
on the relationships among auditor independence, auditors’ personal attributes, and financial 
statement reliability.
1 AICPA, Code of Professional Conduct (New York: AICPA, 1998 edition), ET 
Section 55.01.
Objectivity is a state of mind, a quality that lends value to a member’s services. It is a 
distinguishing feature of the profession. The principle of objectivity imposes the 
obligation to be impartial, intellectually honest, and free of conflicts of interest. 
Independence precludes relationships that may appear to impair a member’s 
objectivity in rendering attestation services.
2 Robert K. Elliott and Peter D. Jacobson, “Audit Independence: Concept and 
Application,” CPA Journal (March 1992), p. 35.
What does it mean to say that the auditor is independent of the assertion [e.g., the 
financial statements] or without bias with respect to the assertion? It means that there 
is no bias of any kind with respect to the assertion, and it also means, by inference, 
that there are no interests causing bias. However, it makes no sense to ban the 
auditor’s interest in the reliability (or truth) of the assertion. Therefore, the auditor 
should have no interest in the financial statements except their reliability.
3 Steven M. H. Wallman, “The Future of Accounting, Part III: Reliability and 
Auditor Independence,” Accounting Horizons (December 1996), p. 79.
After all, the ultimate goal of auditor independence is not independence for its own 
sake—although that is a goal that some seem to seek. Rather, it is to ensure the 
ongoing reliability of accounting and financial reporting and the effectiveness of our 
system of capital formation.
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4 AICPA, Serving the Public Interest: A New Conceptual Framework for Auditor 
Independence (White Paper) (New York: AICPA, 1997), pp. 14-15.
In operational terms, independence ensures that those who perform an audit or other 
assurance engagement will be mentally objective when obtaining, examining, and 
reporting on information. Independence, therefore, constitutes one of the cornerstones 
of the accounting profession.
5 Robert K. Elliott and Peter D. Jacobson, “Audit Independence Concepts,” CPA 
Journal (December 1998), p. 32.
A usefully stated objective of audit independence would capture both the cost and the 
benefit side of the contribution to the capital markets. Here is the way such an 
objective might be formulated:
The purpose of audit independence is to improve the cost effectiveness of the 
capital markets.
This objective follows from the idea that the purpose of auditing is to improve the 
cost-effectiveness of the capital markets (independence improves auditing, which 
should improve the cost-effectiveness of the capital markets).
Goals Related to Perceptions, Credibility, and Confidence
A second group of examples of goals of auditor independence, like Goals 3 and 4 (and related 
modifications), focuses on the relationship among independence, perceptions of various 
groups of stakeholders, financial statement credibility, and stakeholders’ confidence.
6 SEC Codification of Financial Reporting Policies, Role of Independence in the 
Auditing Process, Section 601.01 (originally issued as part of Accounting Series 
Release No. 247, May 26,1978).
The role of the independent accountant as an outside expert has expanded. Auditors 
now perform limited reviews of interim financial information and, on occasion, report 
the results of such reviews in Commission filings. In addition, generally accepted 
auditing standards require auditors to report to their clients material weaknesses in 
internal accounting controls that come to their attention during an examination of 
financial statements in accordance with such standards.
The increased participation by the independent accountant in the financial reporting 
process makes it even more important that this relationship be fully understood and 
appreciated by investors and other users of financial information. To sustain 
confidence in financial statements by their users, the Commission and the accounting 
profession require that auditors remain independent, both in fact and appearance, of 
the companies they audit.
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7 SEC Codification of Financial Reporting Policies, Role of Independence in the 
Auditing Process, Section 601.01 (originally issued as part of Accounting Series 
Release No. 296, August 20, 1981).
The Commission continues to endorse and require scrupulous adherence to these 
principles [of independence as defined by generally accepted auditing standards]. The 
Commission views both the fact and appearance of independence as essential in order 
that the public may justifiably view the audit process as a wholly unbiased review of 
management’s presentation of the corporate financial picture. Through his audit and 
certification, the auditor provides the means for independently checking and confirming 
the information reported by corporations. Independence is thus of vital importance to 
investors, creditors, agencies of government and others who rely on the public 
accountant’s opinion that financial statements fairly reflect the financial position and 
results of operations of the enterprise which he has audited. Absent independence, in 
fact and appearance, investors will have little confidence in public companies as 
investment vehicles.
8 Auditing Standards Board, Australian Accounting Research Foundation, Auditor 
Independence, Statement of Auditing Practice AUP 32, 1992, para. 6.
The concept of independence is fundamental to auditing, since the auditor’s objective 
is to enhance, through the expression of an independent opinion, the credibility of the 
reported financial information of an entity. The value of the independent audit lies 
both in the fact that the auditor is, and is seen to be, independent of the audited entity, 
and hence is able to carry out the audit free of any externally imposed constraints.
9 Office of the Chief Accountant, Securities and Exchange Commission, Staff 
Report on Auditor Independence (March 1994), p. 2.
The independence of accountants who audit the financial statements included in filings 
with the Commission is crucial to the credibility of financial reporting and, in turn, the 
capital formation process. The public confidence in the reliability of issuers’ financial 
statements that is provided by the performance of independent audits encourages 
investment in securities issued by public companies. This sense of confidence 
depends on reasonable investors perceiving auditors as independent professionals who 
have neither mutual nor conflicting interests with their audit clients and who exercise 
objective and impartial judgment on all issues brought to their attention.
10 Steven M. H. Wallman, “The Future of Accounting, Part III: Reliability and 
Auditor Independence,” Accounting Horizons (December 1996), p. 79.
Finally, an examination of auditor independence also involves consideration of not only 
the realities, but also the public’s perception, of independence. Some argue, credibly, 
that this should not be the case. However, these two factors do interact, and although 
public perception may not always be based on fact, it is important to the public’s 
confidence in accounting information.
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APPENDIX C
Examples of Definitions of Auditor Independence
This appendix contains examples of both definitions and descriptions of auditor independence 
found in a variety of authoritative and nonauthoritative sources in addition to those discussed 
in Section IV. The examples are divided into five groups; the first three groups roughly 
parallel the sequence of the definitions discussed in that section. Within each group, the 
examples are presented in chronological order. In some cases, however, precise chronological 
order was difficult to determine because it is unclear when some examples first appeared in the 
literature.
Personal Attributes Approach
Examples in the first group, like Definitions 1, 2, and 3 in Section IV, are based on a personal 
attributes approach, focusing on the qualities that individual auditors should'possess.
1 John L. Carey, Professional Ethics of Public Accounting (New York: American 
Institute of Accountants, 1946), p. 7.
Independence is an abstract concept, and it is difficult to define either generally 
or in its peculiar application to the certified public accountant. Essentially it is 
a state of mind. It is partly synonymous with honesty, integrity, courage, 
character. It means, in simplest terms, that the certified public accountant will 
tell the truth as he sees it, and will permit no influence, financial or sentimental, 
to turn him from that course.
2 Carey, Professional Ethics of Public Accounting, pp. 20-21.
But independence has come to have a special meaning to certified public 
accountants in conjunction with auditing and expressing opinions on financial 
statements. Here independence has come to be almost a “term of art.” The 
reason is that investors, credit grantors, prospective purchasers of businesses, 
regulatory agencies of government, and others may rely on a certified public 
accountant's opinion that financial statements fairly reflect the financial 
position and results of operations of the enterprise which he has audited. It is 
most important that the CPA not only shall refuse to subordinate his judgment 
to that of others but that he be independent of any self-interest which might 
warp his judgment even subconsciously in reporting whether or not the 
financial position and net income are fairly presented. Independence in this 
context means objectivity or lack of bias in forming delicate judgments.
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3 American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Code of Professional Ethics 
(AICPA: New York, 1977 edition), ET Section 52.02. 84
84 This language was included by the SEC in Accounting Series Release No. 296 (August 20, 1981). See SEC 
Codification of Financial Reporting Policies, Section 601.01.
Independence has traditionally been defined by the profession as the ability to 
act with integrity and objectivity.
Activities and Relationships Approach
Examples in the second group, like Definitions 4, 5, and 6 in Section IV, are based on an 
activities and relationships approach that emphasizes external indicators of auditor 
independence.
4 Australian Accounting Research Foundation (AARF), “Auditor Independence,” 
Statement of Auditing Practice (AUP) 32 (Melbourne: AARF, 1992), para. 7.
The professional ethical pronouncements ... define independence as a freedom 
from any interest incompatible with integrity and objectivity..
5 AICPA, Serving the Public Interest: A New Conceptual Framework for Auditor 
Independence (White Paper) (New York: AICPA, 1997), p. 7.
For purposes of the new framework, independence would be defined as an 
absence of interests that create an unacceptable risk of bias with respect to the 
quality or context of information that is the subject of an audit engagement.
6 New Zealand Society of Accountants (NZSA), “Guideline on Integrity, 
Objectivity and Independence,” Ethical Guideline No. 1 (Wellington: NZSA, 
1982 [revised 1991]), para. 9.
Independence has come to have a special meaning to members [of the New 
Zealand Society of Accountants] in conjunction with professional engagements 
resulting in opinions on financial information. In this sense, independence 
means avoidance of situations which would tend to impair objectivity or create 
personal bias which would influence judgments.
7 Robert K. Elliott and Peter D. Jacobson, “Audit Independence Concepts,” CPA 
Journal (December 1998), p. 34.
Audit independence is an absence of interests that create an unacceptable risk 
of material bias with respect to the reliability of financial statements.
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Focus on Perceptions, Credibility, and Confidence
The third group of examples, like the definitions and additions in Section IV beginning with 
Definition 7, focuses on the perceptions of users of financial statements and other 
stakeholders as well as on the goals of auditor independence that deal with enhancing financial 
statement credibility and stakeholder confidence.
8 AICPA, Code of Professional Conduct (New York: AICPA, 1998 edition), ET 
Section 55.01.
Objectivity is a state of mind, a quality that lends value to a member’s services. 
It is a distinguishing feature of the profession. The principle of objectivity 
imposes the obligation to be impartial, intellectually honest, and free of 
conflicts of interest. Independence precludes relationships that may appear to 
impair a member's objectivity in rendering attestation services.
9 Independence Issues Committee, Materiality Task Force, “Preliminary 
Analysis of the Use of the Materiality Concept for Independence Purposes” 
(unpublished, 1998), p. 1 (footnote omitted).
An auditor is independent when informed investors, knowing all the facts and 
circumstances surrounding relevant relationships, matters and situations, would 
conclude that there is no more than an insignificant risk that auditor objectivity 
would be impaired.
10 SEC, Financial Reporting Release No. 50: The Establishment and Improvement of 
Standards Related to Auditor Independence (Washington, DC: SEC, February 18, 
1998), Section I.
Pursuant to the Commission’s regulations, the basic test for auditor 
independence is whether a reasonable investor, knowing all relevant facts and 
circumstances, would perceive an auditor as having neither mutual nor 
conflicting interests with its audit client and as exercising objective and 
impartial judgment on all issues brought to the auditor’s attention. In 
determining whether an auditor is independent, the Commission considers all 
relevant facts and circumstances, and its consideration is not confined to the 
relationships existing in connection with the filing of reports with the 
Commission.
Multidimensional Approach
A fourth approach to describing independence found in the literature views the concept of 
independence as having several dimensions, each of which requires a separate description or 
definition.
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11 John L. Carey, Professional Ethics of Public Accounting (New York: American 
Institute of Accountants, 1946), pp. 21-22.
To sum up, independence has two meanings to the certified public accountant. 
First, in the sense of not being subordinate, it means an aspect of integrity, 
which is expected of all professional men, and enables them to accept 
responsibility. Second, in the narrower sense in which it is used in conjunction 
with auditing and expressing opinions on financial statements, independence 
means avoidance of any relationships which might, even subconsciously, 
impair the CPA’s objectivity as auditor.
12 Carman G. Blough, “Responsibility to Third Parties,” Journal of Accountancy 
(May 1960), p. 60.
When considering independence, one must not only look at his own mind to see 
whether the relationship is such that he feels there might be danger of his being 
biased, he must also examine the situation and try to see how it would look 
through the eyes of those who will be called upon to rely upon his 
representation. One had better sacrifice the business that such a relationship 
would bring than run the risk of letting his judgment be distorted to the point 
where he might not be completely objective, or of destroying his usefulness by 
appearing to others to be lacking in independence.
13 Robert K. Mautz and Hussein A. Sharaf, The Philosophy of Auditing (American 
Accounting Association, 1961), pp. 204-05.
This is to say that real independence is of little value if those who read an 
auditor's report refuse to acknowledge that independence does exist. Thus 
there are two aspects of independence requiring attention if a useful concept is 
to be developed; these are, first, the real independence of the individual 
practitioner in the performance of his work and, second, the apparent 
independence of auditors as a professional group. For the purposes of this 
chapter, we will refer to these as “practitioner-independence” and “profession­
independence” respectively.
The meaning of practitioner-independence seems clear. It has to do with the 
ability of the individual practitioner to maintain the proper attitude in the 
planning of his audit program, the performance of his verification work, and the 
preparation of his report. Profession-independence has to do with the image of 
auditors as a group brought to mind when the term “auditor” or CPA is used.
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14 D. R. Carmichael and R. J. Swieringa, “The Compatibility of Auditing 
Independence and Management Services—An Identification of Issues,” 
Accounting Review (October 1968), pp. 698-99.
Professional independence—This phase of independence is essential to the 
practice of any profession. To attain professional independence, the auditor 
must possess an approach and attitude which make him self-reliant and not 
subordinate to his client. Additionally, the auditor must be free from control or 
influence of management in making decisions based upon universal standards, 
specificity of professional expertise, and authority based on his expertise. 
Professional independence is based on control by self-imposed standards and 
peer-group surveillance and, therefore, requires freedom from control by 
superiors.
Audit independence—This phase of independence is peculiar to the CPA’s 
function of examining and expressing opinions on financial statements. To 
attain audit independence, the auditor must “be independent of any self-interest 
which might warp his judgment even subconsciously in reporting whether or 
not the financial position and net income are fairly presented. Independence in 
this context means objectivity or lack of bias in forming delicate judgments” 
[Carey, Professional Ethics, pp. 20-21].
The freedom from bias and prejudice required to attain audit 
independence carries an implication of duality. Not only must the auditor 
refrain from intentionally favoring the client’s interests in planning his 
examination, gathering evidence, and preparing his report, he must also avoid 
any unintentional feelings which might cause him to take such actions. The 
basic nature of these two situations is so divergent that they deserve separate 
recognition. The question of avoidance of intentionally biased and prejudicial 
action is referred to as “objective audit independence,” while the 
subconsciously motivated facet is referred to as “subjective audit 
independence.”
Perceived independence—[One aspect of this phase is that it] involves a 
reasonable and knowledgeable individual’s perception of an individual 
practitioner’s independence.. .. The other phase of perceived independence, 
then, is the general public’s perception of the profession as a whole. The 
perceived independence of auditors as a professional group is something quite 
different from the perceived independence of an individual practitioner; the 
former is a matter of professional image, while the latter is an evaluation of 
singular circumstances. Accordingly, the appearance of independence should 
be recognized as a dichotomy, composed of “individual perceived 
independence” and “group perceived independence.”
Another important facet of this two-fold phase of independence is the 
fact that it is solely a matter of perception. . .. This means that an observer’s 
opinion will be based, not on the objective features of a situation, but on the 
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meaning that situation has for him. This facet of perceived independence 
should not be ignored.
15 Federation Des Experts Comptables Europeens (FEE), Statutory Audit 
Independence and Objectivity (Brussels: FEE, 1998), p. 8 and note 1.
Independence1 is the main means by which the statutory auditor 
demonstrates that he can perform his task in an objective manner. In dealing 
with independence, one must address both:
• Independence of mind, i.e., the state of mind which has regard to 
all considerations relevant to the task in hand but no other; and
• Independence in appearance, i.e., the avoidance of facts and 
circumstances which are so significant that an informed third party
would question the statutory auditor’s objectivity.
1 Use of the word ‘independence’ on its own has often created 
misunderstandings in discussing this topic because standing alone the word 
appears to denote an absolute standard which professionals must attain. It 
leads observers to suppose that a person exercising professional judgement 
ought to be free from all economic, financial, and other relationships which 
appear to entail dependence of any kind. This is manifestly impossible, as 
every member of society has some dependency and relationship with every 
other.
16 International Federation of Accountants (IFAC), “Independence—Proposed 
Changes to the Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants” (New York: IFAC, 
August, 1999), paras. 8.1-8.4 (footnotes omitted).
It is in the public interest, and therefore required by IFAC’s Code of Ethics, 
that professional accountants in public practice who undertake reporting 
assignments be independent of the entities on which they are reporting and the 
subject matter of their reports.
Independence requires the qualities of objectivity and integrity. Objectivity is 
the intellectual quality of freedom from bias; integrity is the moral quality of 
honesty. Both qualities relate to independence of mind.
In addition to independence of mind, the public interest requires that reporting 
accountants be concerned about the appearance of independence. 
Relationships with clients that may appear to affect judgments by the 
reporting accountant present threats or risks to independence. Reporting 
accountants have an obligation to evaluate those relationships and to take 
appropriate action to eliminate the threats and risks, or to reduce them to 
acceptable levels. Such evaluation and action should be supported by evidence 
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prepared before accepting the reporting assignment and during the course of 
the assignment.
The reporting accountant must be both (a) independent of mind, and (b) 
independent in appearance.
17 American Institute of Certified Public Accountants/National Association of State 
Boards of Accountancy, Exposure Draft, “Proposed Model Code of Conduct” 
(August 18, 1999 revised), Principle VII.
A licensee should be independent in fact and appearance. Independence in fact 
is the absence of a licensee’s interest in, relationship with, or services provided 
to, a person or entity, that results in the licensee’s loss of objectivity. 
Independence in appearance is the absence of such interests, relationships, or 
services which may, to a reasonable person having knowledge of all the facts, 
appear to result in an unacceptable threat to the licensee’s objectivity.
When considering independence issues, it is presumed that the reasonable 
person would consider, among other factors:
• A licensee’s normal strength of character under the circumstances;
• Pressures that may be exerted on the licensee by clients and others;
• The countervailing pressures of legal liability and professional discipline, 
including loss of reputation and license; and
• The safeguards established by the profession for the licensee’s practice 
entity, such as peer review and quality control standards.
Academic Approaches
A fifth group of definitions and descriptions of auditor independence includes those developed 
by academic researchers writing about positive accounting theory, developing theoretical 
models, and describing empirical research. Although these examples are not intended to be 
operational definitions, they do provide another view of auditor independence.
Positive theory views auditing as one of the methods by which contracts among owners, 
managers, and stockholders can be monitored. Audits provide value only if the parties to the 
contract believe that the probability that the auditor will report a breach of the provisions of 
the contract is greater than zero.
18 Ross L. Watts and Jerold L. Zimmerman, Positive Accounting Theory 
(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1986), pp. 314-15 and note 3.
The probability an auditor reports a breach, conditional on a breach occurring, 
depends on
1. The probability that the auditor discovers a given breach
2. The probability that the auditor reports the discovered breach
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The first probability (discovery) depends on the auditor’s competence and the 
quantity of inputs devoted to the audit. The second probability (reporting) 
refers to the auditor’s independence from the client. If the client pressures 
the auditor to not disclose a discovered breach, will the auditor withstand the 
client’s pressure?
To create a demand for audit services, auditors have to convince the market that 
they have some competence (i.e., there is a nonzero probability the auditor will 
discover a breach) and that they will have some independence from the client 
(i.e., there is a nonzero probability that the auditor will report a discovered 
breach). The market will only be convinced of the latter if auditors stand to 
lose something by never reporting breaches. If auditors have nothing to lose by 
succumbing to managerial pressures not to report a breach and if managers can 
impose costs on them, auditors will succumb.
Since voluntary corporate auditing has survived for over 600 years ... 
institutions and contractual arrangements must exist that provide the auditor 
with incentives to be independent, to resist the manager’s pressures. Those 
institutions and arrangements include the auditor’s reputation, professional 
societies, the audit firm’s organizational form, and large-scale audit firms. 
Further, the institutions and contractual arrangements have evolved over time 
as the capital market’s structure has changed.
3
Note that we do not expect auditors to be totally independent (i.e., report 
discovered breaches with probability 1). The auditor trades off the cost of 
reporting and not reporting a discovered breach, and there is no reason to 
believe that an extreme policy is adopted.
Researchers also have spent considerable effort developing models of the market for audits 
that have included definitions of auditor independence.
19 Linda E. DeAngelo, “Auditor Independence, ‘Low Balling,' and Disclosure 
Regulation,” Journal of Accounting and Economics (August 1981), p. 116 
(footnote omitted).
The level of auditor independence is defined as the conditional probability that, 
given a breach has been discovered, the auditor will report the breach.
20 Robert P. Magee and Mei-Chiun Tseng, “Audit Pricing and Independence,” 
Accounting Review (April 1990), p. 317.
[We] define independence as an auditor’s making reporting decisions consistent 
with his or her beliefs as to whether the reporting decision may be regarded as 
an audit failure. That is, an auditor compromises his or her independence when 
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he or she allows the client to use a reporting policy that he or she believes 
would be viewed as an audit failure.
Other researchers have developed formal theoretical models of the manager-auditor- 
stockholder relationship based on the principles of game theory. In the context of auditors 
and managers cooperating in pursuing their own self-interests, some of these models include 
analytical definitions of alternative expressions of auditor independence.85
85 See, for example, Rick Antle, “The Auditor as an Economic Agent,” Journal of Accounting Research 
(Autumn 1982), pp. 503-27, and “Auditor Independence,” Journal of Accounting Research (Spring 1984), pp. 
1-20.
21 Mark Penno and John S. Watts, “An Independent Auditor’s Ex Post Criteria for 
the Disclosure of Information,” Journal of Accounting Research (Supplement 
1991), p. 195.
If the auditor’s preferences over disclosures depend neither directly on 
management’s wishes nor indirectly on management’s preferences (for example, 
through future audit fees), one could say that the auditor is “independent.”
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